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 “…And yet the time at which free enterprise was showing itself in an 
unnaturally harsh form, was the very time in which economists were most lavish in 
their praises of it. This was partly because they saw clearly…the cruelty of the yoke of 
custom and rigid ordinance which it had displaced… But partly also it was that the 
productive forces which free enterprise was giving to the nation were the only means 
by which it could offer a successful resistance to Napoleon. Economists therefore 
treated free enterprise not indeed as an unmixed good, but as a less evil than such 
regulation as was practicable at the time.” 
 









 “Now is the time for workers to forcefully claim the ANC as their own. Today, 
the ANC has become the most contested organisation in the world. Now is the time to 
state unequivocally that we want to make the ANC in our own image, recognizing that 
elements of capital outside and within the ANC will struggle bitterly to steal our 
organisation for themselves.” 
 















 Upon release from prison in February 1990, Nelson Mandela delivered a 
series of speeches that will be remembered as some of the more inspiring moments in 
South African history. The future president devoted much energy to thanking and 
urging on the members of the liberation movement and its international supporters. 
Yet he also touched upon his vision for the future of South African public policy. In 
the political sphere, these included dreams of democracy, of institutional equity, and 
of healing the rifts that threatened to rent South Africa apart in bloodshed and chaos. 
But in economic policy, the African National Congress’s aims were decidedly radical: 
 
The nationalization of the banks, and the mines, and the major industries is the 
policy of the ANC. Any change to this policy is unthinkable.1 
 
 These were particularly bold statements at a time when much of the 
international, or at least western, policy-making community had eschewed 
nationalization and committed itself to reducing the influence of the state in the 
economy. At the same time, the European communist bloc was collapsing. A vaguely 
socialist program had been favored by those involved in the modern South African 
liberation movement since its genesis in the 1950’s. It called for redistribution of 
wealth from those who had benefited from apartheid to those oppressed by it, the 
control of South Africa’s abundant natural resources by the state, and the role of the 
state as guarantor of full employment. 
 The National Party, the architects and operators of the apartheid machinery, 
had long tried to inculcate fear of the rooi gevaar (red danger) in order to deflect 
criticism of its pernicious activities.2 By the late 1980’s, the National Party and its 
sympathizers faced a number of formidable physical and ideological opponents in the 
                                                 
1 Mandela, Nelson. Address: Cape Town, February 23, 1990. 





liberation movement. Chief among these were the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and its intellectual sister, the South African Communist Party 
(SACP). These two organizations did much to define ANC economic thinking during 
the waning days of apartheid. Since 1994 they have constituted, along with the ANC, 
the Tripartite Alliance. The ANC acts as the spearhead of the alliance, with COSATU 
and the SACP as junior partners, ostensibly to assist in the management of the 
economy. This coalition has governed South Africa since liberation. By the early 
1990’s, COSATU and the SACP had built a seemingly robust statist consensus within 
the liberation movement. And yet, it would take less than five years for this policy 
concord to be unraveled. 
 The basic political objectives of the South African revolution were relatively 
simple, if difficult to achieve: to deracialize South African society, to grant equal 
liberties to all citizens under a constitutional democratic government, and to earn 
South Africa a respected place in the community of nations. The economic objectives 
of the movement could not be articulated as cleanly or as gracefully. In their earliest 
incarnations, they appeared relatively consistent: redress of the inequality caused and 
perpetuated by the apartheid regime, an interventionist state, and a weakening of 
white monopoly capital. More then 10 years later, the picture is much more 
complicated, replete with internal contradiction and strife.  
 On September 27, 2000, South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel stood 
up to deliver the closing speech at the IMF- World Bank joint meetings in Prague. 
The cautious and respected minister closed the tense 2000 meetings to applause, 
hailing progress from his position as chair-by-invitation of the joint meetings of the 
Bretton Woods institutions.  
 The South African state had traveled a great distance, from a place where 
foreigners avoided its leaders to one where its official was invited to preside over the 
conference of the world’s great financial bodies. From pariah to darling. By the turn 
of the millennium, the leaders of the ANC had ingratiated themselves with the 
international financial community through economic policy reform. ANC leaders 
 
 6 
guided policy away from the socialist push of the early 1990’s, first toward a neo-
Keynesian program, and finally toward an orientation broadly in line with the western 
neoliberal consensus of the end of the 20th century.   
 This thesis examines a set of institutional relationships that have heavily 
influenced the trajectory of these changes: those among the largest International 
Financial Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank), the African National Congress 
(ANC), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The aim of this 
study is to analyze the interaction of the ruling party of South Africa, the international 
financial community, and the South African labor movement.3  
 The IMF and the World Bank represent the intellectual vanguard of 
international finance, especially with regard to developing countries. This is not to 
say that the IFIs are entirely beholden to the interests of private finance or of 
developed states; in some respects the aforementioned players look to the IFIs for 
guidance. There is a great amount of give-and-take between the IFIs, states, private 
finance, and academia (as well as movement of personnel between these spheres). 
Certainly, there are moments at which developed countries, particularly the United 
States, force the IFI’s to implement very specific policies. However, at no point since 
1994 have developed countries concerned themselves with South Africa to this 
degree. In South Africa, the Bretton Woods institutions act with relative 
independence. 
 Since the 1970’s, the IFIs have increasingly charged themselves with tasks of 
surveillance and acting as counselors (and often more like managers) to developing 
nations.4 This is particularly true of South Africa, which the IFIs have seen as a 
country in transition that could greatly benefit from their guidance. 
                                                 
3 In order to simplify this nebulous system of relationships, specific institutions must serve as 
proxies for the greater world financial community and for the South African labor movement. 
The IFIs will serve as the former and COSATU as the latter, for reasons enumerated on pages 
3 and 4. 
4 See Helleiner, Eric. States and  the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods 
to the 1990’s Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. 
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 Why was this so? After all, murmurs were already being heard in the halls of 
the IMF that perhaps the heavy-handed structural adjustment medicine administered 
in the 1980’s and early 1990’s had been a mistake. Davison Budhoo, a former IMF 
and World Bank economist who had recently left the institutions, commented in 1989 
that:  
 
 President Reagan effectively told us to go out and make the Third World a 
 new bastion of free wheeling capitalism, and how we responded with joy and 
 with a sense of mission! ... Everything we did from 1983 onward was based 
 on our new sense of mission to have the south 'privatized' or die; toward this 
 end we ignominiously created economic bedlam in Latin America and Africa 
 In 1983-88.5 
 
Yet, as will be evident below, IFI officials believed South Africa to be uniquely 
positioned to benefit from liberalization. The post-apartheid government inherited 
relatively well developed infrastructure and a heavy, if outdated, industrial base. 
Low-wage labor was abundant. Compared to countries at similar income levels, 
South Africa had an exceptionally capital intensive economy, indicating that 
apartheid policies had prevented labor from being employed as it might have been in 
more stable circumstances: in low-wage, labor intensive, export-oriented production. 
The IFIs saw themselves as positioned to be the facilitators of a transition toward a 
more ‘natural’ economic structure in South Africa. This would allow it to reach full 
employment, enter a track of export-led-growth, and ‘climb the value ladder’.6 In 
                                                 
5 Budhoo, Davison. Quoted in: Nasser, Alan. “The Tendency to Privatize” Monthly Review 
54:6 (March 2003); 
 
6 The only states that have achieved such ‘virtuous’ pattern of growth during the last 50 years 
have been ‘developmental states’, which have developed behind constantly shifting trade 
barriers and heavily interventionist tactics by the state.  
See, for instance: 
Wade, Robert. Governing the Market. Princeton University Press: 1990. 
Chang, Ha-Joon. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective 
London: Anthem Press, 2002 
Stiglitz, Joseph, and Andrew Charlton. Fair Trade: How Trade can Promote Development 
Oxford University Press: 2005 
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short, the developmental doctrine accepted in the IFIs during the 1990’s and early in 
this decade led the institutions to believe in a fundamental need for liberalization in 
South Africa. 
 COSATU is South Africa’s largest and most powerful labor federation, and is 
the only one directly allied with the ANC. It is therefore the part of the labor 
movement with both the greatest impact on policy and the most to gain or lose 
through reform. As such, it is be the only part of the labor movement dealt with 
below. 
 The SACP has largely ceased to function as an effective political body, 
although there is some overlap in personnel between it and COSATU/ the ANC.7 
During much of the apartheid, it was an intellectual force that weighed strongly on 
the economic outlook of the liberation movement. Many of the top ANC freedom 
fighters were members of the SACP during their time in exile. However, as the 
moment of liberation approached, the SACP’s more radical members were 
marginalized by a coalition of more ideologically supple ANC and COSATU 
leaders.8 For many involved in the ‘struggle’, Marxism only went skin deep, while 
yearning for african liberation struck to the core. Although the SACP is technically a 
member of the Tripartite Alliance, it had already become a weak member by the early 
1990’s. It will not be discussed below at much length 
 It is not the express object of this essay to make judgment upon the changes in 
South African economic policy since 1994. Sufficient time has not elapsed since the 
launch of certain measures, notably GEAR, in order to make empirically based 
judgments. Rather, I will investigate the way in which policy has reflected and 
                                                 
7 Mckinley, Dale. “The End of Innocence: The Alliance and the Left” South African Labour 
Bulletin 25:1 (January 2001) 
 
8 While the SACP was, and is, considered a radical organization, most of its members had 
ceased to embrace theories of historical Marxism by the late 1980’s. Instead of believing in 
the ultimate fate of society to be that of proletarian revolt, the SACP proposed large-scale 
(but not necessarily complete) nationalization and redistribution;  
Nash, Andrew. “The Moment of Western Marxism in South Africa” in Bramble, Thomas, and 




affected the relationship between the three sets of institutions mentioned above. Some 
critical analysis of specific policies is necessary in order to fully understand these 
interactions. This paper will provide multiple examples in which the ANC pursued or 
is pursuing measures that both adhere to western norms as embodied by the IFIs and 
also negatively affect COSATU.9 
  
 This thesis begins with the claim that the changes in government economic 
policy since 1994 have marginalized COSATU. The questions explored are then as 
follows: How did transformation inside the ANC occur? Why did the ANC make a 
‘right turn’ after 1995? How has COSATU responded? How have the IFIs affected 
ANC preferences? And, most importantly: why have they done so? 
 There are two principal institutional elements to the changes that have 
occurred since the advent of democracy. First, the intellectual leaders of the ANC 
have consistently and vigorously embraced economic strategy based on a liberal 
paradigm. These principals have been the same as those espoused by the IFIs; at the 
moment of their implementation, the reforms examined below were considered 
pivotal and essential by the Bretton Woods institutions. I do not claim that the ANC 
was duped or inordinately pressured by international elites. The IFIs simply did not, 
and do not possess the leverage on Pretoria to issue credible threats. Nor have the IFIs 
coerced or completely managed to buy off (although they have tried) the elites of the 
South African government. Instead, the ANC bought in to the so-called consensus of 
the late 20th century western world. It did so voluntarily, energetically, and earnestly. 
The recent history South Africa testifies to the persuasive power of the liberal creed, 
and to the elegance with which it simplifies the bewildering set of personal, power, 
econo-rational, ethnic, and random effects that define the international economy. 
 It also speaks to the explanatory role of institutional structure and composition 
in predicting policy outcomes. COSATU has proven itself incapable of reversing the 
                                                 
9 I do not aim to normatively condemn ANC or IFI sponsored policy in broad strokes. But 




ANC’s move to the right. At certain points, the unions have dampened or arrested it, 
but they have not succeeded in turning the tide. COSATU has not led a counter-
revolution because of its institutional weakness. The ANC has exploited this 
weakness, this dearth of expertise, of resources, and of organizational capacity. The 
ANC has confounded the unions with adroit philosophical posturing, while 
COASATU has lost much of its intellectual muscle to the ANC and to the private 
sector since liberation. 
 A most puzzling question then remains. Why, in the face of protestation by its 
largest ally and broad domestic discord, especially among the poor blacks that the 
ANC battled so fervently for, has the ANC proceeded along this path? I hold that 
ANC policy has serially reflected not only the general philosophy of the IFIs, but also 
their specific, and sometimes ephemeral, interests. I come to this conclusion through 
inductive reasoning, as the series of cases below will elucidate the perplexing 
reflection of IFI preoccupations in Pretoria. Why, then, has this been so? 
 The attraction that economic orthodoxy holds for the ANC must stem from at 
least one, and likely both, of two sources. In the first instance, the ANC believes that 
earning the approval of the IFIs will lead to increased interest in South Africa by 
foreign investors. For better or for worse, international investors treat the IFIs as 
interpreters of policy signals.10 South Africa, largely isolated from foreign markets at 
the end of apartheid, has placed great (but, in fairness, not exclusive) faith in foreign 
direct investment to boost both growth and employment. COSATU, distrustful of 
multinational corporations and sometimes cognizant of the holes in an approach 
reliant upon fickle foreigners, has been wary of such a strategy.  
                                                 
10 This is particularly true in the case of Latin American and African countries, where the IFIs 
have been particularly active during the last two decades. Investors look to the Bretton woods 




 As of yet, the foreign investment upon which the ANC’s hopes have largely 
rested has not materialized.11 So, is there something else inherently attractive about 
adherence to western orthodoxy?   
 The ANC stepped out of the shadow of apartheid with a desire to establish the 
new South Africa as a leader among African nations, among developing nations, and 
among all the nations of the world. Did the liberation party’s leaders bring too a 
desire to establish themselves as members of an international elite? Ambition to enter 
elite circles cannot easily be divorced from desire to improve investor perceptions. 
The two can be mutually reinforcing; perhaps, in the case of South Africa, a country 
with strong cultural ties to Europe, native elites believed that ingratiating themselves 
with their western counterparts would spur investment and growth. ANC leaders have 
been discreet enough to remain mum on this subject, and one can only speculate 
about their true motives. But their stubborn defense of an investor-oriented program 
in the face of domestic discontent and less-than-stellar results stirs the suspicion that 
such considerations influence policy.  
 
 The past ten years have witnessed progressively worsening strain within the 
Tripartite Alliance. In contrast, the post-apartheid period began with a series of 
measures that solidified the labor-ANC coalition. The Government of National Unity 
(GNU), the administration that entered office in 1994, unveiled its first 
comprehensive economic program, the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), in the same year. The RDP represented the combined efforts of COSATU, 
SACP, and ANC officials. It was universally regarded as a victory for workers, the 
poor, and progressive intellectual elements.12 Furthermore, in the mid and late 1990’s, 
                                                 
11 In the late 1990’s, GEAR did not fundamentally alter investor’s perceptions despite the 
supposed credibility boost it gave the South African state, loosening of capital controls has 
brought little long term investment, and privatization has been a failure. It appears that the 
ANC may yet make another push, this time to advantage employers, and hopefully the 
unemployed, through labor law reform. 
12 Lodge, Tom. Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki Bloomington, IN: 
University of Indiana Press. 2003. p. 54 
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COSATU-sponsored legislation rendered South Africa one of the friendliest states 
vis-à-vis workers in the developing world (assuming that they are employed, and 
many of them are not).13  
 But the tide had begun to turn by mid-1995. The last decade has witnessed an 
assault, ad seriatim, on measures favorable to labor. This trend has not affected all 
facets of policy; the ANC has exhibited a certain schizophrenia. This has been 
particularly true since President Mbeki took office in 1999. The ANC’s control of 
economic policy levers then strengthened significantly, at the expense of both labor 
and the formerly NP-led bureaucracy.14 Recently, the government has made motions 
to relax the self-imposed fiscal austerity of the late 1990’s, has shown renewed 
cautiousness about capital account openness, and has backed off of rapid privatization 
plans. It has also moved recently to embrace industrial policy, a move that expressly 
contradicts the wishes of the IFIs. Two policy threads are visible; one neoliberal, and 
one that has evinced certain aspects of a ‘developmental state’.15 
  However, the liberal strain of policy has been dominant since 1995 (if slightly 
less so during the past three years). In this thesis, four sequential examples will 
elucidate this trend. These are: capital account liberalization; the Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) program of 1996; privatization of state 
assets and services in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s; and the current debate about 
labor market reform. 
 These are very prescient examples, as none of these policies can yet be 
deemed successful. South Africa probably dropped its capital controls prematurely, 
focused too much upon macroeconomic stability as stipulated by GEAR, entered 
without valid reason into contracts with private water firms, and may now be 
preparing to make a revamped labor regime the centerpiece of its pro-employment 
                                                 
13 Southall, Robert. “Marginalisation: Can COSATU rely on the Alliance?” South African 
Labour Bulletin 25:3 (June 2001) 
14 Lodge, Tom. Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki Bloomington, IN: 
University of Indiana Press. 2003 p. 66 
15 The latter includes the Motor Vehicle Industry Development Programme, which is explored 
in Chapter 8. 
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strategy. The deficiencies in these strategies further attest to the ANC’s loyalty to 
orthodox policy. 
 None of the institutions written about below should be seen as monolithic. 
COSATU, compared to the ANC, and especially compared with the Bretton Woods 
sisters, is a ‘weak’ institution. Due to its roots in the combative atmosphere of late-
apartheid labor relations and to the withholding of educational resources from blacks 
by the apartheid regime, it suffers from a dearth of intellectual muscle. To be certain, 
some of its leaders fully understand the ramifications of policy decisions. 
Nonetheless, in certain instances, COSATU has proven incapable of providing 
direction, leaving spaces to be exploited by rightward-leaning members of the ANC 
(the best example being that of monetary policy). 
 Neither are the IFIs juggernauts with inalterable preferences. They are not 
composed of ‘knee-jerk neoliberals’, as some critics claim. The policy interests and 
positions of the IFIs vis-à-vis South Africa have changed significantly since the mid-
1990’s. In an interview with the author, Dr. Trevor Alleyne, an economist working in 
the IMF’s South Africa department from 1998-2000, admitted that the Fund had 
misjudged the proper speed of capital account opening in South Africa during the mid 
to late 1990’s.16  
 The ANC itself is composed of various and shifting factions; it has not been 
easy for ANC leaders to convince the rank-and-file of the value of the liberal ethos. 
Indeed, it may soon attempt to deflect criticism with a state-led industrial strategy 
(although this is not likely the only reason for the move). Finance Minister Manuel, 
one of the ANC officials at the forefront of the withdrawal from étatisme and the 
embrace of neoliberal precepts, cautioned the IMF and World Bank at the close of the 
2000 meetings to “guard against [a] one-size-fits-all [approach].”17 Ironically, Manuel 
had already implemented strategies that belied a belief in such a universal consensus.  
                                                 
16 Alleyne, Trevor. Interview with the author: Washington DC, March 15, 2006. 
17 Manuel, Trevor. Address to the Joint Meetings of the World Bank and IMF. Prague, 
September 27, 2000. 
 
 14 
 The success of classical liberalism (or a revamped version thereof) during the 
last half century and, indeed, during the last 200 years, has led scholars of as great 
notoriety as Francis Fukuyama to designate liberal capitalism as the rational end point 
to a dialectical historical process.18 While many historians, political scientists, and 
other observers strongly criticized this conclusion from an empirical and a 
philosophical standpoint, the spread of liberal economic values, particularly among 
elites, has been astonishing.19 South Africa fits well within this wider picture. In fact, 
it is a particularly instructive case, due to the peculiar nature of the South African 
economy, of the interplay between it and the political transition to democracy, and of 
the legacy bequeathed to the liberation leaders. One might argue that South Africa is 
uniquely unsuited to the application of neoliberalism. It relies greatly, although 
decreasingly, on natural resource exports, produces chronically at a level below its 
potential capacity, and requires political calculations in economic decision making 
that render simple investment choices complex and compromise the quantitative 
methods of neoclassical models. Furthermore, its labor movement’s position remains 
closely tied to its role in the liberation struggle. Yet, even against this unfavorable 
backdrop, liberalism has largely prevailed since 1994. 
  
 This thesis proceeds in the following manner: 
 Chapter 2 recaps the pre and post 1994 events that have shaped the current 
atmosphere in which the three institutional actors (IFIs, COSATU, and the ANC) find 
themselves. It briefly chronicles the transition from apartheid to democracy, paying 
particular attention to the economic complications therein. It also discusses the 
structure of the South African economy and the performance of key measures such as 
growth and unemployment.  
 Chapter 3 contextualizes the role of each of the three relevant institutional 
forces. It describes COSATU’s structure and changing role within the Tripartite 
                                                 
18 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Perennial, 1992. 
19 See: Blyth, Mark. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the 
Twentieth Century Cambridge University Press: 2002. 
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Alliance, and provides a brief history of the ANC’s leadership and activities in the 
post-apartheid period. It also relays key moments in the IFIs’ relationship with South 
Africa, briefly tracing the evolution of the institutions’ role in the late apartheid and 
early democratic periods. 
 In chapter 4 begins the case-based analysis, with a look at the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme, the first broad post-apartheid economic plan. The 
RDP’s release is the final event preceding the ‘rightward’ shift in orientation. It is 
also the last moment at which the overall economic thrust evinces consideration of 
COSATU’s concerns. The ANC rose to power on a platform expressly designed to 
reverse the evils of apartheid. In the early period of its rule, policy reflected that 
preoccupation. 
 With chapter 5 commences the series of cases in which the ANC indulges the 
concerns of international powers, marginalizing COSATU in the process. This 
progression starts with reforms that seemed relatively innocuous: the liberalization of 
capital controls, beginning in 1995 with the abolition of the ‘dual rand’ currency 
system. Consultation on matters of currency is one of the chief functions of the IFIs, 
and they played a principal role in these events. Ignored initially by COSATU, these 
reforms led ultimately to grave consequences for labor. 
 The loosening of capital controls opened the door to those in favor of a 
neoliberal program, and helped to turn the ANC toward such ideas. Chapter 6 
describes the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Programme (GEAR), a 
neoliberal adjustment program par-excellence.20 GEAR caught COSATU by surprise, 
and the union movement has not since regained the position that it held before its 
implementation. 
 Chapter 7 traces the debate over privatization in South Africa, specifically 
examining the case of municipal water services privatization. In this area, the IFIs 
played an exceptionally aggressive role. The Bretton Woods twins, taking a 
                                                 
20 Taylor, Ian. Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations 




temporarily inordinate interest in water services privatization, saw their ideas tested in 
a number of experiments in South Africa, all of which failed.  
 The final chapter brings us to the present. Recent signals indicate that the 
ANC is preparing to step onto labor’s sacred ground, that of labor market regulation. 
Renewed debate in Pretoria again coincides with a crescendo of rising interest in 
Washington. After proving itself fiscally responsible, responsive to investors, and 
having exhausted options for privatization, the ANC may be preparing for another 























History and the South African Economy 
 
 A. The End of Apartheid 
 
 On December 1, 1985, in a context of unrest that threatened to degenerate into 
civil war, a number of individual trade unions and loose union federations officially 
allied and became COSATU. The National Party (NP) had not yet unbanned the 
ANC, and Nelson Mandela still languished at Robben Island prison. In 1979, the 
Weihahn commission, an NP appointed advisory body, counseled then Prime 
Minister Botha to permit africans (blacks) to form trade unions, so as to avoid the 
wildcat strikes that characterized the mid-1970’s.21 COSATU quickly became a nexus 
of trade union and more general liberation movement activity. COSATU events 
became anti-apartheid rallies, and much both non-violent and armed organizing took 
place within the COSATU and FOSATU structures.22 
  In 1983, a group with wide-ranging affiliations, including students, clergy, 
and workers, launched the United Democratic Front. During the mid 1980’s the civil 
society-based UDF acted as the intellectual and organizational center of the liberation 
movement inside the country. However, by 1988, as the moment of Mandela’s release 
approached, COSATU had become the movement’s vanguard.23 The african labor 
movement channeled its burgeoning political capacity toward the broader struggle. 
COSATU thus ceased to be a traditional trade union, transforming into a ‘Social 
Movement Union’.24  
                                                 
21 Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1994. 
p. 123 
22 FOSATU is the Federation of South African Trade Unions. Today, it is much smaller than 
COSATU, with a membership of approximately 400,000, as opposed to COSATU’s 2 
million. 
23 Von Holdt, Karl. Transition from Below: Forging Trade Unionism and Workplace Change 
in South Africa  Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2003. p. 23 
24 An SMU is defined as a union that both ‘encourages mass mobilization of members’ for 
issues not directly related to labor, and ‘pursues broader social objectives’ more generally; 
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 Shortly after the new National Party Prime Minister F.W. De Klerk 
succumbed to internal and international pressure to unban the ANC, a Mandela craze 
swept South Africa. The nearly boundless charisma of the future president and his 
party overshadowed COSATU’s travails during the preceding five years.25 Worship 
of the long-imprisoned Mandela reached a messianic proportion, even among 
workers. In the late 1980’s at the Highveld Steel complex, a site of concerted 
COSATU activity against the apartheid workplace, COSATU shopstewards refused 
to negotiate with their managers for days on end, demanding that the bosses “release 
Mandela first.”26 
 On February 11, 1990, authorities released Mandela from house arrest. 
According to historian Leonard Thompson, the De Klerk government had no initial 
intention to dismantle any appreciable portion of the apartheid structure. Certainly, 
they did not intend to usher in majority black rule. Rather, the NP planned to repeal 
certain apartheid measures, such as some of the pass laws and the support for the 
fictitiously independent “Bantustans”, and would agree to grant local governing 
powers to black townships. They wanted to ensure, however, that no black majority 
ever sat in a national parliament and that capital remained in white hands.27 They 
failed in the former respect. Twelve years later, they can arguably claim success in 
the latter. 
 Mandela, along with deputies such as Thabo Mbeki and one of labor’s future 
champions, Jacob Zuma, quickly deflated the National Party’s fantasy. The ANC had 
all but sealed an end to apartheid by 1992, although observers feared a slide into 
                                                                                                                                           
Bramble, Tom. “Social Movement Unionism Since the Fall of Apartheid: The Case of 
NUMSA on the East Rand” in Thomas Bramble and Franco Barchiesi, eds. Rethinking the 
Labour Movement in the New South Africa  London: Ashgate, 2003. p. 187 
25 Thompson, Leonard. A History of South Africa New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. p. 
412 
26Von Holdt, Karl. Transition from Below: Forging Trade Unionism and Workplace Change 
in South Africa  Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2003. p. 183 




further violence, and possibly a fully fledged war.28 Fortunately, the ANC and the 
NP, with substantial assistance from the international community, diffused tensions to 
such a degree that South Africa could hold its first democratic election in April, 1994. 
The ANC then came to power. 
 With the ANC came its alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP. Each 
initially provided a significant amount of intellectual muscle to the ANC 
administration, which was largely comprised of exiled leaders not yet acclimated to a 
South Africa that had changed so much during their time abroad.29 South African 
labor believed that its time had come, and the first administration released the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and a slew of labor friendly 
laws. After this brief period, however, labor’s power would diminish.  
  
 B. Fundamental Aspects of the South African Economy 
 
 Perhaps more than any other factor, more than the explosion of violence 
among blacks and between blacks and security forces in the townships, more than the 
condemnation of South Africa by the African and western world, the collapse of the 
apartheid economy heralded the end of white rule.30 According to Chris Stals, the 
National Party-appointed South African Reserve Bank Governor, in 1989: 
  
If adequate progress is not made in the field of political and constitutional 
reform…South Africa will remain a capital exporting and debt repaying 
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country for years…and the standard of living for South Africans will, at best, 
rise only slowly.31  
 
 While this may sound mild when contrasted with the harsh rhetoric of the 
early 1990’s among both black and white political leaders, it is a remarkably strident 
remark considering its attribution to an Afrikaner economist (and one that would 
remain as head of the Reserve Bank during Mandela’s presidential term, for reasons 
directly related to the IFIs). Afrikaner capital had been one of the primary 
beneficiaries of apartheid policies, which aimed not only to maintain a reserve of 
cheap black labor, but to target Afrikaner business interests with special incentives 
and subsidies. The successes of the 1950’s, 60’s, and early 70’s, when South Africa 
pursued a relatively fruitful Import Substitution Industrialization policy, coupled with 
periodic mining booms that brought windfall profits,32 had evaporated. The 
corporatist (when considering Afrikaans speakers) system of Volkskapitalisme 
foundered.33 Perhaps uniquely among such cases in recent history, the sanctions 
levied on South Africa in the 1980’s effectively pressured the government into 
democratic reform.34 
  
  1. Growth 
  
 The Government of National Unity inherited an economic disaster. In 1980, at 
the tail end of the sharpest nominal gold price boom of the 20th century, South 
Africa’s GDP/capita was approximately R24000 (in 2004 rand), or $3700. In 1994 it 
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was R20500 ($3150). Income disparity between whites, the wealthiest group, and 
africans, the poorest, was, and is, vast. In 1975, whites ‘earned’ approximately 
R70000 ($10800) per capita, while blacks were paid a paltry R6300 (less than 
$1000). By 1994, that differential had narrowed slightly, with white incomes 8.6 
times larger than black incomes (as opposed to 10.9 times in 1975).35 This relative 
level of disparity has remained nearly constant since 1994, narrowing slightly during 
the past three years.36     
 During the 1960’s, apartheid’s “golden decade” (literally), the South African 
economy grew at an average of 5.7% annually. During the 1980’s, it grew at 1.5% 
annually, and per capita income fell due to an acceleration of population growth. 
Between 1990 and 1993, the economy contracted at rate of negative 0.4%/year while 
the population exploded. Meanwhile, central government debt ballooned from 36% of 
annual GDP in 1990 to 50% by 1994.  
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 Concurrently, the National Party rounded out its rule with a defiantly 
irresponsible spending spree. Public deficit spiraled to over 9% of annual GDP during 
1993.37 The motivations behind this profligacy were twofold. In the first instance, 
defense expenditures rose during the unrest that characterized apartheid’s last years, a 
time when growth and tax revenues suffered greatly due to protest-related non-
payment in the townships and homelands. Secondly, the NP, which had built a 
bloated bureaucracy as an employment safety net for Afrikaners (and they used it: by 
1990, 50% of working Afrikaner males drew public salaries)38, doubled, tripled, or 
quadrupled contributions to the public pension fund.39 The apartheid regime spitefully 
saddled the GNU with debt. 
 Since liberation, the economy has experienced both growth and contraction, 
and has not lived up to the expectations of most South Africans for the nascent 
democracy’s success. A period of relative investor euphoria followed the peaceful 
conclusion of the 1994 elections.40 Per capita GDP growth became positive between 
1994 and 1996. It then suffered a reversal between 1996 and 2001, before recovering 
again.41 In 1998, South Africa registered a decline in GDP per head of -1.8%. In 
2004, the first year in which growth approached the government’s expectations, GDP 
per capita grew at just over 4%.42 
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 The South African economy is characterized by a disjuncture that President 
Mbeki refers to as that of the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ economies.43 While one out of 
every four South Africans experience hunger at some point during each month,44 the 
Johannesburg financial markets are as sophisticated as any mid-size European 
bourse.45 The Johannesburg Securities Exchange ranks 12th worldwide in overall 
capitalization, even after Anglo American and De Beers, the two largest mining 
consortia, delisted in the late 1990’s.46 South Africa’s GINI coefficient (a statistical 
measure of inequality), hovers around 0.6, as high as that of Brazil.47 Only 11 million 
South Africans, out of a population of 46 million, are employed in the formal sector.48 
Surprisingly, it appears that informal employment in South Africa does not account 
for any substantial portion of the officially unemployed, as it is does in countries with 
comparably high rates of unemployment, such as Brazil.49 
 The South African economy therefore operates at two speeds. It appears that 
the ‘second’ economy, largely rural and with high rates of indigence, remains 
stagnant despite the efforts of the ANC to provide basic services in the post-apartheid 
period. This economy does not interact very closely with the labor movement, which 
primarily represents formally employed urban workers.  
 In 1998, GDP per capita hit a local trough of negative 1.8% and positive .5% 
in overall GDP growth. The dramatic dive in South Africa’s growth rate in 1998, as 
well as those of 1996/7 and 2001, can be partially attributed to the currency crisis of 
that year. The 1998 crisis originated in Southeast Asia in late 1997 and spread as a 
contagion, causing investors to pull out of developing economies regardless of their 
individual fundamentals.  
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  2. Unemployment 
  
 Today, South Africa’s official unemployment rate stands at 27%, one of the 
highest rates in the world.50 COSATU’s chief economist, Neva Makgleta, estimates 
that unemployment is really over 40%, if one accounts for ‘discouraged’ workers.51 
ANC Finance Minister Trevor Manuel directly rebuffed Makgleta’s claim recently by 
stating that “if we really had an unemployment rate of 40%, there would have been a 
revolution by now.”52 However, the long-serving Manuel’s deputy, Jabu Moleketi, 
admitted in October 2005 that the government believed unemployment to be as high 
as Makgleta’s estimation.53 
 Notwithstanding debate about the exact rate, mass unemployment constitutes 
perhaps the gravest problem for South Africa after HIV/AIDS. The economy has 
proven unable to absorb most of its young people during the past 15 years. According 
to Statistics South Africa (the public statistical service), over 50% of active members 
of the population between 15 and 24 are unemployed, as are 33% of 25 to 34 year 
olds. The figure for 45 to 54 year olds is only 5%, although this count likely excludes 
a large number of discouraged workers.54 Not surprisingly, spreads among workers of 
different races are staggering. Unemployment among whites has hovered between 4 
and 8% in the post-apartheid period, while african unemployment has consistently 
topped 30%, and indians and coloureds have found themselves in between.55  
  
 C. A Creature of Apartheid 
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 Apartheid left South Africa with a legacy of deep structural problems. These 
continue to be the primary obstacles to growth and higher rates of employment.56 The 
apartheid pass laws denied most africans (blacks) the privilege of residing in the 
major cities, although some were permitted to live in township hostels as guest 
workers. The National Party designed and then strongly promoted the ‘homelands’, 
which functioned as african labor reserves largely destitute of internal economic 
activity.  Millions of South Africans find themselves living today either in these 
former ‘Bantustans’ or in townships demarcated by apartheid administrators. The 
township residents often live so far from nodes of economic activity that they must 
commute long distances to reach the fringes of industrial or commercial areas.  
 The disparities in productive capacity between regions that benefited from 
white capital investment and those that primarily encapsulate the old homelands are 
staggering. In 2004, 1324 ‘large’ private businesses were headquartered in Gauteng, 
which encompasses Johannesburg and Pretoria. Limpopo, a province with a 
population 60% the size of Gauteng’s, counted only 29 such businesses.57 Gauteng is 
the traditional heartland of white-financed industry and services. Most of Limpopo’s 
residents live in areas formerly designated as ‘homelands’.  
 Little progress has been made since 1994 on alleviating these spatial 
inequities. Some observers do not acknowledge that the persistently high rate of 
structural unemployment should be attributed to the legacy of apartheid. The ANC, 
which stresses the racial unity of South Africa, has tempered its anti-white rhetoric 
since the advent of democracy. One of the unforeseen consequences of this, however, 
has been that the ANC has pursued economic policies that have not focused 
sufficiently on the spatial and educational consequences of apartheid.  
 The IFIs and the international financial community, while certainly 
recognizing these issues, often fail to comprehend their pivotal nature. The ANC has 
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been chided to look away from apartheid distortions, confusing a cleansing process 
with an overeager search for external solutions to internal problems. COSATU, which 
itself has not articulated an exceptionally coherent economic philosophy, has allowed 
this ANC and IFI failure to adversely affect its position within the governing alliance. 
 
 D. The Current Political Context 
 
 The Tripartite Alliance today operates within a context of a disaffected 
COSATU and an ANC exhibiting flagrancy in disregard of COSATU preferences. 
The SACP plays at the margins, if at all. There has long been present within 
COSATU a faction that had favored splintering from the ANC and founding a 
workers party. In 1993, the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa 
(NUMSA), a COSATU member union, proposed that the federation end its alliance 
with the ANC in the aftermath of the 1994 election.58 Rumors frequently circulate 
that a majority of COSATU members would support a split from the ANC. The 
sources of these rumors are not clear; polls routinely find low percentages of 
confederation members in favor of such a schism. Roger Southall, a professor of 
Political Science at Rhodes University, estimates that “there is very little support for 
the formation of a worker’s party.”59 Nevertheless, the presence of such a faction 
complicates an already strained alliance. 
 The current environment is also one of increasingly public agitation among 
workers. The year 2004 saw the most industrial action in terms of man-hours lost 
since 2001, the year of the massive anti-privatization stay-aways.60 Many COSATU 
member unions have partaken in strikes in the past year. These include the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) strike at the Aflease company gold fields (wage 
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dispute), a series of strikes by NUM at Harmony Gold (to protest retrenchments), and 
a united COSATU stay-away in June meant to demonstrate frustration that “economic 
growth has not benefited workers”, according to COSATU president Willie 
Madisha.61  
 The popularity on which the ANC rode to historic victory in 1994 has not 
waned. In 2004, the ANC received more than 70% of the vote in both national 
parliamentary and presidential elections. The 2006 municipal election saw the ‘party 
of liberation’ slip slightly, while still dominating its opponents with about 2/3 of the 
vote. Thabo Mbeki was sworn in for a second five year term in 2004, and the party is 
currently in the process of debating choices for his successor.   
 One man who may not be considered is Jacob Zuma. A former ANC exile 
based for years in Swaziland and Mozambique, Zuma became Deputy Secretary-
General of the ANC in 1991. In 1999 he became Thabo Mbeki’s Deputy President, 
and was consequently regarded as Mbeki’s heir.62 Organized african labor knows 
Zuma as the most labor friendly official in the top echelon of government.63 A 
charismatic speaker, able administrator, and deft operator, Zuma was also one of the 
four members of Mandela’s original cabinet to have fought with Umkhonto We Sizwe 
(Spear of the Nation), the ANC’s armed branch of the struggle years. Thus he has 
formidable apartheid-era credentials and extensive post-apartheid experience.  
 On October 11, 2005, Zuma was arraigned in Durban on charges of 
corruption, stemming from his relationship with his financial advisor. Mbeki axed 
him from the position of Deputy President in the summer of 2005, after prosecutors 
accused Zuma of wrongdoing. Mbeki then appointed the then Minister of Minerals 
and Energy, Ms. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, to the office vacated by Zuma. 
Observers do not consider Mlambo-Ngcuka a probable presidential candidate.  
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 COSATU leaders and other Zuma supporters have cried foul, especially after 
a rape charge was added to his list of headaches (and for which the trail has already 
opened). COSATU, in a number of public statements, has accused the ANC of 
making Zuma the victim of an anti-labor witch hunt, intended to bring forces opposed 
to the neoliberal bent of South African policy to heel. COSATU has also stated that 
the defense of Zuma should be an opportunity to stand up to its alliance partner. 
According to COSATU Secretary-General Zwelinzima Vavi, when interviewed in 
October 2005 outside the Durban courthouse in which Zuma was being arraigned: 
 
COSATU doesn’t regret for one moment taking the stance that it did 
throughout the [Zuma] saga… [If we had not], Zuma would have been thrown 
to the lions like so many others before him.64 
 
These are strong recriminations considering that they come from the leader of a union 
movement technically allied to the ANC. Zuma himself commands a large personal 
support base. Over one thousand people, calling themselves ‘The Friends of Jacob 
Zuma’, stood outside the Durban courthouse on October 11, chanting “Zuma, my 
president, my president!”65  
 South Africa’s recent economic and political history has been tumultuous, 
even if it pales in comparison to the late apartheid period. Meager progress in 
economic recovery and reconstruction on non-racial lines has exacerbated the 
tensions already rising within the alliance due to the ANC’s move to the right. Before 
moving on to that story, however, the positions of COSATU, the ANC, and the IFIs 
in South Africa should be examined in greater depth.  
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 A. COSATU  
  
 COSATU, the only South Africa labor federation with a voice in government, 
is comprised of 21 member unions, with a total of 1.8 million paid-up workers. An 
additional 200,000 are registered as members. The largest unions in the confederation 
are the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)- 300,000 members, the National 
Allied Health and Education Workers Union (NEHAWU)- 234,000 members, the 
South African Democratic Teachers Unions (SADTU)- 214,000 members, the 
National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA)- 144,000 members, the 
South African State and Allied Workers Union (SASAWU)- 144,000 members, and 
the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU)- 115,000 members.  
 The Confederation’s structure comprises of a small number of secretariat 
officers at headquarters in Johannesburg, as well as officers in each province. 
COSATU itself does not employ a large number of officials; the weight of both 
representing and coordinating the organization falls on a rather small number of 
people. As COSATU’s position will be later contrasted with the IFIs, institutions with 
almost limitless capacity compared to that of COSATU, this becomes one of the 
major constraints facing the unions within an already asymmetrical relationship. 
 Coordination between COSATU central and regional offices, let alone 
COSATU and its members, is weak and tenuous. While members do not commit to 
industrial action without approval from above, different levels of the organization do 
not engage in ideological discussion as effectively as might be expected. For instance, 
COSATU, due to a repositioning that began during the early 1990’s, does not 
envision South Africa becoming a Marxist state in the foreseeable future.66 And yet, 
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according to a 2001 article in the South African Labour Bulletin by Dumisa Ntuli, a 
NUMSA officer: 
  
NUMSA remains fully committed to the establishment of socialism in South 
Africa, where workers will fully control the means of production.67 
 
 The COSATU leadership core has remained relatively stable since the mid 
1990’s. Zwelinzima Vavi, the current Secretary-General, served as Deputy Secretary-
General from 1993-1999 and as chief organizer of the NUM in the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s. In a twist that presages the difficultly that COSATU would have 
contesting the ANC-led liberal revolution, Vavi did not attend school until his late 
teens.68 As Secretary-General, Vavi is the day-to-day chief of COSATU operations. 
Willie Madisha is president of COSATU. He arrived on the national stage through the 
South African Democratic Teachers Union, and also served in the SACP in a variety 
of capacities. With a background in teaching, Madisha is responsible for high-level 
discussions within the Tripartite Alliance. However, Vavi himself has represented 
COSATU in several high profile international fora, including the December 1999 
WTO meetings in Seattle.   
 External pressures and temptations have further contributed to the weakening 
of COSATU’s intellectual and organizational capacity. At the moment of the 1994 
elections, 60 COSATU officials, representing well over half of the total officials on 
the national payroll, left the organization to accept positions in Pretoria or in the 
regional legislatures. Many of the organization’s brightest stars left for positions in 
business. For example, James Motlatsi, the fiery former Secretary-General of the 
NUM, eventually took an executive position with the Anglo American mega-
conglomerate. Member unions have suffered the same loss of talent at the 
shopsteward level. Clever employers are partially to blame for this. In order to fulfill 
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the requirements of the Black Economic Empowerment acts, employers often choose 
the most energetic shopstewards in their plants and offer to outsource to them a piece 
of their business.69  
 In order to rectify these potentially fatal problems, COSATU must expand its 
financial capacity. In 1994, COSATU paid its national staffers (except for a select 
few leaders), R1800/ month (~ $500/ month). Many of these charismatic organizers 
were confronted with private industry or even ANC jobs offering two to three times 
that remuneration.70 COSATU has also demonstrated little ability to balance its 
books. In 2003, the COSATU treasurer discovered financial loses of over R50 million 
($8 million), chalked up to the failure of member unions to pay their dues. This 
resulted in measures such as the restriction of photocopy paper use at the 
Johannesburg headquarters and the cutting of telephone lines at provincial offices.71 
By contrast, the World Bank spent $900 million worldwide on internal expenses 
(salaries, facility upkeep, travel, etc.) between June 2003 and June 2004.72 
 Ideologically, COSATU remains somewhat schizophrenic. Different union 
leaders and COSATU central leaders often espouse conflicting views. However, there 
has emerged a pattern since 1990. Between 1990 and 1992, COSATU did not deviate 
from a socialist line. Between 1993 and 1996, the federation embraced a neo-
Keynesian ideology. Finally, after 1996, COSATU entered a period of confused 
rhetoric, where it tacitly accepted many of the ANC’s liberal prescriptions while 
vociferously contesting others.73 This progression will be further explored below.  
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 B. The ANC 
 
 Within South Africa’s borders, no political force disputes the power of  the 
ANC. The opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), a patchwork of Afrikaans-speaking 
coloured formations, smaller Anglophone white parties, and bits of the former NP, 
does not effectively contest ANC rule outside of the DA stronghold of Western Cape. 
The Inkatha Freedom Party, a Zulu patronage network whose influence barely 
extends outside of Kwazulu-Natal, constitutes the only other major force. 
 As the 1990’s drew on, Mandela delegated more and more of the everyday 
party responsibilities to Thabo Mbeki. Many of the ministers in the current 
government are part of Mbeki’s network, and are “unlikely to rock the Mbeki boat.”74 
Mbeki now controls a fairly disciplined party.75  
 Most of the current ANC leaders were raised on a socialist ideology. In the 
1950’s, mirroring the socialist bent of most African anti-colonial discourse, Mandela 
called South Africa a case of “monopoly-capitalist-fascism gone mad.”76 Many such 
attitudes survived the next 40 years, while ANC leaders often operated from 
communist-sponsored camps in Angola and Mozambique. However, with the return 
of the ANC to South Africa in 1990, the organization became aware that proclaiming 
itself a socialist movement would lead to an impasse in negotiations with the white 
government and would mar its all-important relationship with the west, particularly 
Thatcher’s and then Major’s Britain. By the early 1990’s, its commitment to Marxism 
had weakened to point where distancing itself entirely from leftist rhetoric presented 
little problem. 
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 The ANC stood in 1994 on an economic platform based on the RDP, a neo-
Keynesian social-democratic document. However, ANC leaders underwent a 
dramatic transformation during the 1990’s. According to historian Thomas Lodge, 
“the Mbeki government has been better for business than any of its predecessors for a 
very long time, [including apartheid administrations].”77 
 
 C. The IFIs in South Africa  
 
 In the World Bank’s 1999 Country Assessment Study, the Bank states that: 
“in South Africa, the bank has piloted the idea of working as a ‘knowledge bank’.”78 
This meant that, although the Bank would not be heavily involved in loan or other 
financial operations in South Africa, it would focus on its other role, that of a research 
body. It was no coincidence that the Bank chose South Africa as the proving ground 
for this experiment; the unique climate in which the Bank became reinvolved with 
South Africa in the early 1990’s provided the appropriate context. A World Bank 
official boasted in 1994 that “South Africa is the only country in the world in which 
we talk to the opposition.”79 The question then becomes: how did the World Bank 
(and its sister institution, the IMF) mould such an environment in South Africa?  
 Between 1966 and 1990, the World Bank’s Pretoria office was dormant; the 
Bank heeded international pressure in 1966 to desist in lending to Henrik Verwoerd’s 
pure et dure apartheid administration. Before 1966, the bank had funded a number of 
infrastructure projects in partnership with South African parastatals Eskom 
(electricity) and Telkom (communication). More egregiously, however, the IMF 
continued to lend to South Africa during most of the apartheid period. In 1981, the 
Fund lent PW Botha’s government $1.1 Billion. The Fund stopped only after the US 
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Congress passed the Gramm Bill, which forbade (upon penalty of congress 
withholding future recapitalization funds) lending to South Africa unless approved by 
the US House Banking Committee in order to “reduce apartheid distortions.”80
 Worse perhaps was the World Bank’s involvement in the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project, beginning in 1986. Throughout the colonial and apartheid periods, 
South Africa ensured that the tribal monarchy of Lesotho did not escape client 
status.81 Since 2000, South African troops have interfered multiple times in Lesotho’s 
internal politics. South Africa takes particular interest in Lesotho because of the 
contribution of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project to the water-poor Rand (West 
Rand, East Rand, and Witwatersrand (Johannesburg metro area)). The Bank provided 
most of the funding for this project knowing fully that it would be used primarily to 
provide water to white customers in Johannesburg.82  
 The primary risk listed in the Bank’s documentation was that Pretoria, not 
Lesotho, would default on the debts incurred in constructing the network of dams.83 
Pretoria had, through creative accounting, insured the loan without it appearing that 
the Bank had operated in South Africa. Today, already strapped consumers in 
Gauteng province (the province that overlays the area of the old Rand) subsidize the 
operation of the overbuilt dam network.84 
 By the late 1980’s, the IMF had reestablished full ties with a ‘liberalizing’ 
National Party. Stanley Fischer, the then IMF chief economist infamous for his role in 
the Structural Adjustment policies of the 1980’s and 1990’s, is a Cape Town native. 
In the early 1990’s, he led a number of missions to South Africa. He was received 
warmly by National Party officials, but less so by skeptical blacks.85  
                                                 
80 Kahn, Brian. “IMF Reform: Debates in South Africa” South African Labour Bulletin 25:3   
(June 2001)  
81 Africa Analysis 19:1 “Lesotho: The Search for ‘White Gold’” (January 1999) 
82 Township municipalities were so resource starved that black residents often relied on 
unsafe water supplies. 
83 Bond, Patrick, Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, IMF, and 
International Finance University of Cape Town Press, 2003. p. 64 
84 Ibid. Bond. p. 64 
85 Ibid. Bond. p. 55 
 
 35 
 The World Bank sent a reconnaissance mission to South Africa in the 
immediate aftermath of Mandela’s release in 1990. The ANC, suspicious of an 
institution that they had observed using heavy-handed tactics in Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, and other Southern African countries, was initially loath to meet with 
the Bank’s delegation. However, after the Bank agreed not to lend to the De Klerk 
government and repeatedly feted ANC leaders in Washington, relations warmed. By 
the late 1990’s, they would become decidedly bubbly. When Tito Mboweni was 
Minister of Labour in the late 1990’s, he refused to meet with IMF delegations. But 
when he ascended to the Governorship of the Reserve Bank in 1999, the former labor 
leader flew to Washington for a fortnight long introduction to the world of central 
banking and international finance at the World Bank and IMF. It cannot, then, have 
been a personal aversion to meeting with IFI officials, but political concerns that 
prevented him from going to Washington during his time at the Department of 
Labour. 
 In the Bank’s 1999 South Africa Country Assessment Study, an occasional 
document that the Bank considers its “most important country specific document”, 
the Bank warns that its “analytical assistance in South Africa” is “complicated by the 
political sensitivity of Bank/South African relations.”86 The Bank still treads very 
lightly in South Africa. Nonetheless, the IFIs have proven themselves adept at 
defending their privileged position against their detractors, among them COSATU.  
 By the early 1990’s, a transformation was taking place within the ANC. This 
would be the change that stewarded the ANC onto a neoliberal path. Observers often 
cite the ANC’s singularity in being a liberation movement that talked about fiscal 
discipline before it took power. While labor and social-democratic interests would 
celebrate the RDP, the first post-apartheid economic program, the seeds had already 
been planted of change in a different direction.  
 
                                                 





The RDP: Labor’s Short Lived Victory 
 
 At the 2001 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, George Soros 
quipped that “today, South Africa is very much in the hands of international 
capital.”87 While the indefatigable Soros is not necessarily an expert on South African 
affairs, he could feel comfortable speaking with conviction on this matter. By 2001, 
South Africa had implemented a neoliberal economic program, opened itself to 
virtually unrestricted capital flows, privatized portions of its largest utilities, and 
pursued investor-friendly fiscal and monetary policies for six years running. The 
question is then: how did this occur? Or, more specifically: how did a party elected on 
the platform of the Reconstruction and Development Programme remake itself as a 
liberal darling? 
 The RDP was the manifestation of the aspirations of COSATU and others 
who advocated that South Africa confront its economic history head-on. However, 
one cannot claim that the RDP did not pay tribute to many of the accepted, tried-and-
true aspects of the late 20th century western policy consensus. It explicitly advocates 
fiscal and monetary discipline. It also eschews Import Substitution Industrialization 
strategies in favor of a more outward looking industry restructuring, implicitly stating 
that tariffs and other import restrictions would decrease under the tutelage of the 
newly formed RDP ministry.88 The subject of nationalization is treated very tenderly 
in the RDP document. Neither is there mention of renegotiation of land-leases from 
the state to the mining conglomerates, about which there had been discussion in the 
ANC and COSATU during the preceding five years. The RDP did not set the alarm 
bells ringing in Washington; both the Bank and the Fund came out initially in favor of 
the document.  
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 Nonetheless, the RDP represented a victory for labor and labor’s allies in the 
ANC over South African business interests and the contemporary orthodoxy of 
economic policy. Over the protestations of the (NP holdover) Finance Minister Derek 
Keys, South African Reserve Bank Governor Chris Stals (also of the old regime) and 
others, the more africanist and left-leaning elements among the RDP’s drafters even 
managed to include a direct snub to the IFIs.89 Among those who demanded that the 
comments remain in the document was Alec Erwin, the white COSATU organizer 
who would later be seduced into overseeing some of the largest state privatization 
efforts from his perch as Minister of the Department of Public Enterprises. The RDP 
White Paper reads: 
 
 The pressures of the world economy and the operations of international 
 organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT… have pressured 
 [our neighbors in Southern Africa] into implementing programs with adverse 
 effects on employment and standards of living…We must reduce our reliance 
 on International Financial Institutions.90 
 
At that moment, South Africa did not, in fact, rely unduly on international institutions 
for funding; the only major debt incurred by South Africa to an IFI in the 1990’s up 
to that point was a 1993 loan of $850 million from the IMF. While the rationale for 
requesting the loan was somewhat dubious (the official line being that it was required 
in order to cushion balance of payments irregularities resulting from a drought, even 
though the drought had ended as long as six months before), the conditions attached 
were by no means draconian. They included reducing the fiscal deficit to below 8% 
of GDP, quite reasonable given the unsustainability of 1993’s deficit of 9.5%, and 
curtailment of public sector wages and pension payments, which had skyrocketed as 
the NP hastened to line the pockets of its loyalists before leaving power. The 
insistence of labor and the SACP that a decidedly anti-IFI statement remain in the 
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RDP therefore demonstrates some of the animosity harbored by black South Africans 
toward the institutions. 
 The RDP, a document worded in terms understandable to lay-people, calls 
broadly for redistribution of resources in the post-apartheid period, job training, 
labor-friendly legislation, new housing, subsidized services, and scores of other 
progressive measures.91 Its recommendations and stipulations cover most broad areas 
of economic reform, including extension of municipal services, pension reform, 
healthcare reform, restructuring of the public sector, investment in transport, creation 
of jobs through public works projects, and provision of credit for community banking 
in underserved areas. It also lays the groundwork for further legislation, including a 
new set of labor regulations. The RDP states that: 
 
 Industrial bargaining forums or industrial councils must play an important role 
 in the implementation of the RDP. Agreements negotiated in such forums 
 should be extended through legislation to all workplaces in that industry. 
 There must be enhanced jurisdiction for these forums to negotiate…92 
   
 Comments about fiscal discipline and trade openness, while present, were not 
central to the project. In the instances where it set numerical targets, the RDP tended 
to set goals for the extension of service provision. It promised one million units of 
new subsidized housing before 1998. To some extent, it delivered; by the year 2000, 
over 1.1 million new housing units had been ‘serviced’.93 It also stipulated that the 
government strive to deliver clean water to all South African households. In 2000, the 
Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF) reported that over 4 million South 
Africans had gained access to clean water since 1994.94 Nowhere did the RDP dare 
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refer to labor market ‘inflexibility’, ‘uncompetitive wages’, or a ‘burdening’ 
negotiation process. 
 Perhaps because it appeared fresh at the fall of the apartheid regime, the RDP 
confronted the structural problems that apartheid bequeathed upon the ANC better 
than subsequent policy documents. Many of these issues and inequalities were micro 
and not macroeconomic in nature, and the RDP reflected that reality. It suggested that 
30% of all white owned lands be redistributed to landless blacks. This 
recommendation echoes precisely one made by the World Bank one year earlier;95 the 
Bank has not ignored apartheid’s legacy, but may have paid it insufficient attention. 
 Indeed, the IFIs have given a fair amount of advice to South Africa that 
contradicts neoliberal orthodoxy. For example, South African workers suffer from a 
low ‘real social wage’ as compared to their nominal wage. This partly represents the 
fact that urban South African workers, unlike their counterparts in many developing 
countries, often cannot rely upon rural familial networks in times of dire need to 
provide basic nourishment or care.96 Apartheid policies tended to favor white 
commercial farming interests over and above other white interests, and they 
engendered a situation in which african farm laborers would rely on remittances from 
urban ‘guest’ workers while overworking marginal plots of land in the ‘Bantustans’.97 
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This can be contrasted with a country such as Taiwan. Taiwan effected a large-scale land 
redistribution program during the mid-20th century, resulting in a rise in the ‘real-social’ wage 
of many urban workers, allowing industry to pay a lower nominal wage and increasing 
industrial competitiveness.  
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The World Bank and the IMF were attuned to this reality in 1994. GEAR would not 
do as well in recognizing these pivotal structural inequities in the South African 
economy.   
 The RDP stipulated in detail programs of investment in service provision and 
infrastructure, while discussing only vaguely the government’s new macroeconomic 
policy. GEAR, the 1996 program that exposed the ANC’s (and to some degree 
COSATU’s) ‘right turn’, would do just the opposite. When the transitional authority 
handed power to the ANC-led Government of National Unity in mid-1994, Mandela 
named former COSATU Secretary-General Jay Naidoo the Minister of the RDP. But 
events may have already been moving in a different direction. Internal contradictions 
in the economic ideas of the ANC were already evident at the time of the RDP’s 
release. Business had geared up to contest the new strategy, and the IFIs watched 
warily the implementation of the new framework. Most surprisingly, some factions in 
COSATU were exhibiting signs that they too might accommodate a more liberal 
program.98 
 
 A. COSATU in Transition 
 
 COSATU’s second conference in 1987, a ferocious gathering of leaders and 
young members of the burgeoning movement, produced a slew of antagonistically 
anti-white, anti-capitalist documents and statements. Leaders reminded the rank-and-
file that their struggle was not only anti-apartheid but also pro-labor: 
 
 While we are involved in a struggle for national liberation, true liberation can 
 only be achieved through an economic and social transformation of our 
 society to serve the interests of the working class.99 
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COSATU would maintain a strictly socialist outlook until 1992, when the COSATU 
Economic Policy Conference released its first proposal. This advocated the 
nationalization of certain industries under worker control and reflected the then 
Marxist character of the organization. COSATU hoped that its socialist program 
would be accepted at the time of elections over the Normative Economic Policy100 
sponsored by the transitional government (comprised of both NP and ANC officials at 
the top levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, but operated by NP-appointed 
functionaries).  
 By 1993, however, glimpses of COSATU’s acceptance of more ‘mainstream’ 
western economic policy were on display. COSATU endorsed and became heavily 
involved in the work of the ANC’s Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG). The 
report of the MERG group has COSATU performing a rhetorical volte-face; where its 
1992 report demanded the nationalization of the ‘commanding heights’ of the 
economy, the MERG report states that “if the private sector is prepared to address 
inequalities of human resource development, the private sector will be handsomely 
rewarded.”101 The MERG report would be drawn upon heavily during the drafting of 
the RDP.  
 The MERG drafting process also saw the first evidence of COSATU’s 
willingness to defer to the ANC on many economic matters. It did manage to generate 
some controversy, however; the MERG coordinator at one point remarked that the 
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South African Reserve Bank should revert to being a subsidiary of the Ministry of 
Finance.102 COSATU briefly celebrated this proposal, but it was later retracted under 
ANC and external pressure, not least from the IFIs. 
 COSATU Secretary-General Jay Naidoo participated heavily in the MERG 
negotiations that resulted in a strongly social-democratic, but certainly not socialist, 
document. This begs us to examine COSATU’s internally contradictory rhetoric, and 
to question whether union movement officials really bought into a socialist program. 
 While Secretary-General Naidoo discussed policy with ANC economists in 
1993, many of the representatives of COSATU’s member unions did not appreciate 
the watershed change in the national office’s ideological position. At the 1993 
NUMSA conference, many of the provincial member-units voted in favor of a 
resolution demanding nationalization without compensation of all industrial capital, 
arguing that “there is no point in [continuing to reward, with rents, whites] who 
robbed us in broad daylight.”103 These factions were not aware that the higher alliance 
structures were no longer even considering such drastic action. This too speaks to 
COSATU’s institutional weakness and its poor intra-organizational communication. 
 COSATU also suffered, and suffers, from a lack of technical talent. During 
the mid 1990’s, COSATU counted on a few stars to represent its interest in 
international and intellectual milieu. These included Jay Naidoo, the Secretary-
General who later became RDP minister, Alec Erwin, the SACP officer tapped to be 
Deputy Finance Minister in the mid 1990’s and current head of the Department of 
Public Enterprises, and labor economist Tito Mboweni, appointed first Minister of 
Labour and later Governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). COSATU 
lost these thinkers to high posts in government shortly after democratization, and the 
holes that they left were not effectively patched. Even toward the end of apartheid, at 
the zenith of COSATU’s influence, the confederation struggled to speak with a 
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unified voice. Moreover, it found relatively high ranking organizers making public 
statements that reflected unsophisticated analysis. In 1994, Tony Ruiters, a former 
COSATU official and head of the RDP provincial ministry in the Western Cape, 
offered this unqualified comment on industrial policy in an essay about the future of 
South Africa-IMF relations: 
 
 There may be a case for arguing that some industries will have to be 
 protected, even if they are not going to make it in terms of world competition, 
 so that we can provide our people with basic necessities.104 
 
 Overall, the RDP can be counted a victory for the interests of labor. The union 
movement applauded the RDP’s stipulation that the power of foreign investors be 
superceded by ‘the national interest’, and cheered that “the RDP [made] an 
unequivocal commitment to fundamental worker rights and the protection of labour 
standards.”105 But the benefits promised by the RDP (often vaguely and non-
prescriptively) would be just as easy eroded and reneged upon. COSATU grumbled 
initially that the RDP failed to mandate collective industry wide-bargaining, à-la 
Sweden. A few years later, this would be the least of the unions’ complaints. 
  
 B. ANC Economics and the RDP 
 
 At all stages of the RDP drafting process, the ANC held most of the levers, 
receiving and accepting assistance from both labor and from the IFIs. The final 
document embodied nearly three years of planning and consultation with scores of 
actors (in a way that GEAR would not). It also exposed, just as in the case of 
COSATU, the conflicting economic perspectives of ANC leaders. According to 
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political economist Hein Marais, the ANC suffered from a “patent absence of 
technically rigorous economists” in the early 1990’s.106 This indicates that, just as the 
poor apartheid-era training of COSATU’s leaders left the door open to extensive 
ANC influence, the ANC would be vulnerable to pressure from the sister institutions 
in Washington.  
 The ANC, the recipient of astonishing adulation in the wake of its 1994 
victory, did not translate its mandate into a particularly clear economic program 
through the RDP. Most of the RDP’s language pandered to the ANC’s more 
progressive factions, but failed to determine targets in key areas. It breezed through 
its treatment of the trade regime, at once implying a reduction of tariffs and promising 
to single out “pivotal” and “well-linked” industries for support. It avoided design of 
an industrial policy.107 For all its talk of democratization of labor practices and 
recognition of worker prerogatives, it danced around discussion of a minimum wage. 
On this subject, none other than Nelson Mandela would implore to the 1994 
COSATU confederation conference that: 
 
 Unless we sacrifice, unless we have the determination to tighten our belts, it is 
 going to be difficult to get the economy to grow.108  
 
COSATU would lose the intra-alliance battle over a nationwide minimum wage in 
1994, presaging the ANC shift in focus toward austerity and suppression of wage 
growth. The claim that has so plagued COSATU, that ‘inflexible’ labor markets 
hamper both employment and overall growth, had already appeared by this point (see 
chapter 8). The ANC leadership contained elements that leaned toward a more liberal 
post-apartheid South African order. Chief among these was Trevor Manuel, the 
present Minister of Finance (appointed 1996), champion of GEAR, and one of the 
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sharpest intellectual forces in the liberation movement. Since 1994, only three men 
have managed the Ministry of Finance: NP holdover Derek Keys, former NP 
supporter Christo Liebenberg, and Manuel. This has not proven to be a recipe for the 
implementation of the most progressive macroeconomic ambitions of the RDP. 
 Most of the South-Africa’s massive business conglomerates swallowed the 
RDP’s medicine. While RDP policy was only effective for a brief period, it did force 
businesses to accept some tax hikes and the redirection of funding away from 
investment that served capital and the white middle classes toward basic service 
provision for the poor. More importantly, it laid the foundation for a new labor 
market dispensation, and 1995 saw a spike in the rate of black wage increases. In 
1995, black incomes also reached their highest level compared to white incomes in 
recent history (at about 12% of white per capita income).109 Some, including the 
largest among the titans, the Anglo American Corporation, publicly supported the 
RDP. But white capital recognized early that the RDP contained loopholes through 
which it might escape its new and onerous responsibilities. In a shareholder meeting 
in early 1995, the chairman of the Barlow-Rand Corporation predicted that “[South 
Africa] will be fighting off the carcass of the RDP for years to come.”110 The World 
Bank and the IMF, initial public boosters of the RDP, may have harbored similar 
sentiments.  
 
 C. The IFIs and the Economics of Liberation  
  
 The early 1990’s saw an onslaught of World Bank and IMF research missions, 
advisory visits, and conferences in South Africa. The first ‘reconnaissance’ missions 
occurred in 1990, with the presence of the IFIs growing thereafter.111 As cited above, 
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the IFIs saw liberation as an unprecedented opportunity to positively affect policy in a 
government that betrayed a dearth of economic expertise and had inherited a complex 
economy featuring pockets of western-level development.112  
 While the IMF lent South Africa US$850 million in 1993 to shore up a 
balance of payments deficit due to poor agricultural performance, the World Bank’s 
presence was much heavier in South Africa than the IMF’s in the years immediately 
preceding and following liberation. The IMF had, to some degree, blackened its name 
in South Africa with its loan to the apartheid regime in 1981. The Bank then eased 
itself into the public role of the enlightened, reformed multilateral institution. It 
initially provided South Africa with policy advice that complemented the aims of the 
MERG and the RDP, namely: redistribution. A 1994 World Bank working paper, 
titled South Africa: Economic Performance and Policy, made this recommendation: 
 
 Increased public investment would directly serve the redistributive objective 
 and contribute to improved social stability. Such investments should, in the 
 presence of greater private investment confidence, generate sufficient upward 
 multiplier effects to drive the economy back toward full capacity.113  
 
This neo-Keynesian demand response reflects an acknowledgement of the realities of 
the South African economy of the early 1990’s. Industry and agriculture had not 
produced at capacity for many years, due to mounting violence, investor skittishness, 
government mismanagement, and trade union action. Cyril Ramaphosa’s National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) called mass strikes in 1992, the Kwazulu ‘homeland’ 
was in a state of war, and 40% of all international firms operating in South Africa in 
1980 had divested completely.114 On a subject that will be discussed at length in 
chapter 5, the World Bank suggested that South Africa not even consider discarding 
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its capital controls for some time after the 1994 election.115 From the early 1980’s 
until the ‘east-Asian’ crisis of 1997/98, the IFIs requested the dismantlement of 
capital controls with particular zeal, even in countries (primarily African) in political 
straits rockier than that of South Africa. Yet the IFIs, at least during the immediate 
post-apartheid period, decided that a traditional Structural Adjustment program would 
not suit South Africa. 
 One must examine closely, however, the time-horizon of the World Bank 
recommendations. A Bank document states that “if external capital inflow resumes to 
a significant extent, the system of foreign exchange controls can be reviewed.”116 It 
was not difficult to predict that a (brief) boom in FDI would follow a successful 
democratic transition. While the World Bank continued to encourage increases in 
public investment in basic services, the fiscal budget deficit in 1993 approached 10% 
and the Bank (as well as the ANC and the SARB) urged its containment. Some of the 
massive discrepancy between revenue and spending could be patched by improving 
tax collection, scaling down the defense force, and curtailing bloated public salaries. 
But it was indeed optimistic to predict that cuts above and beyond these would not be 
necessary in order to bring South Africa in line with ‘international standards’ (or 
deficits ~ under 3% of GDP).  
 Overall, the IFIs approved of the RDP’s redistributive mission, and they 
agreed that some time would be required for restructuring South Africa’s economy 
before liberalization could be pursued. They misread, on the balance, the length of 
that period. The legacy of apartheid still constrains today the ability of the South 
African government to coax the South African economy onto its potential growth 
path using orthodox economic measures (such as opening the country to capital flows 
and awaiting productive investment while praying that local companies do not send 
assets abroad). The memories of some within the ANC and the IFIs proved short, as 
will be demonstrated in the next chapter. The removal of capital controls, a process 
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that began in 1995, contributed greatly to an ideological sea-change within the ANC, 
one encouraged by IFI pressure. The befuddled labor movement, fresh from victory in 
the struggle, did not appreciate the significance of the unification of the ‘two rands’. 
And it would cost them dearly. The abolition of the financial rand activated the 
ANC’s desire to please the powers of international finance, demonstrated the deft 


























The End of the Financial Rand and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
 
 On September 27, 1995, the IMF bestowed upon South African Reserve Bank 
Governor Chris Stals the award for ‘Central Banker of the Year’. The Fund praised 
Stals’ “bold decision” to scrap the financial rand, the discounted currency used for 
international capital transactions.117 The two rands officially became one on March 
13, 1995, and between that point and the night that the IMF honored Stals, the rand’s 
value remained relatively stable.118 The five years that followed would be a very 
different experience. They were marked by three distinct currency crises, in 1996, 
1998, and 2001. Each curtailed short-term and medium-term growth and bred lasting 
fear of rand instability. Yet at few points after 1995 did the ANC seriously consider 
the revival of capital controls. This chapter examines the end of the financial rand and 
its consequences. 
 By 1993, myriad forces inside and outside South Africa were clamoring for 
the unification of the two rands. Many among these predicted (somewhat 
incongruously when compared to experience in other developing countries) that the 
lifting of capital controls and the concomitant increase in currency volatility would 
only marginally affect economic outcomes. An essay written in 1993 by Ronnie 
Bethlehem, the chairman of the South Africa Chamber of Commerce, reads: 
 
 [If the financial rand is discarded], negative shocks will cause forex 
 instability, but that need not be the end of the world…Within weeks corrective 
 speculative forces will assert themselves, provided that we have the IMF and 
 other countries playing a supporting role.119  
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Alas, this was not to be; the spring holiday that followed the early 1995 unification of 
the rands gave way to the first round of speculative attacks in 1996. And this first 
spike in instability paled in comparison to those of 1998 and 2001. While the new 
rand traded at an average of 3.62 per dollar in 1995, it peaked at 13.85 per dollar in 
December 2001, before plummeting again and leveling off at between 6 and 7. Since 
the unified rand began trading freely on world forex markets, the rand has been one of 
the most volatile currencies of the world.  
 In addition to the effects of currency instability, the scraping of the financial 
rand engendered, in very short order, the drafting and ultimate acceptance of GEAR, 
the program engineered to placate uneasy investors. Banker and author Cees 
Bruggemans made this case (perhaps unintentionally) when he wrote that “the 
February 1996 rand [devaluation] acted as a wake call to the government…It signaled 
a worse crisis and contraction if nothing was done.”120 To the bankers, the IFIs, and a 
select few planners in the ANC hierarchy (especially Mbeki and Manuel), there was 
only one option. Further liberalization of capital and trade would have to accompany 
a revamped economic plan centered on achieving fiscal stability and low inflation. 
The removal of capital controls had altered the prevalent paradigm such that there 
was only one way ‘forward’. 
 The unification of the two rands and the contemporaneous relaxation of 
capital controls should be seen as the pivotal point at which South Africa unwittingly 
committed itself to neoliberal orthodoxy. From these actions was born a self-fulfilling 
prophesy: open currency trade to foreign interests, and their market power will usher 
you toward policy in line with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. Little did 
COSATU understand that this step taken in 1995 would set off a chain-reaction. We 
must then examine how this was allowed to occur, and in what ways the three actors 
treated in this paper participated in, were affected by, and reacted to the proceedings. 
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 A. The End of the Financial Rand 
 
 Between 1946 and 1976, South Africa was a net importer of capital in all but 
four years: 1959-1963, the years following the ‘Sharpeville Massacre’.121 The 
currency system established at Bretton Woods discouraged most types of speculative 
flows during at least the first two decades of this period. South Africa offered enticing 
opportunities for foreign investors in the mining sector, and the country still managed 
to be a net importer of capital despite what was widely considered to be an 
overvaluation of the rand, maintained to promote Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI). Between 1977 and 1980, the capital account became negative. It then reversed 
itself on the back of the gold demand frenzy of 1979-1980, which pushed gold up to a 
real dollar historical high of over $600 dollars/ounce. However, the composition of 
investment in South Africa had changed. It had become more speculative, more often 
in equities and bonds, and less long-term and geared toward industrial production.122 
This augured badly for a South Africa slipping into a protracted period of violent 
unrest.  
 Capital flight struck South Africa in the 1980’s, culminating in 1985 as waves 
of strikes paralyzed much of the country while violence escalated. In August 1985, 
Chase Manhattan refused to continue loaning to the state of South Africa, and the rest 
of the financial community followed suit.123 PW Botha’s government unilaterally 
declared a ‘debt standstill’, freezing repayment and calling for negotiations. The 
government then created the financial rand (finrand) and declared all domestic assets 
held by foreigners to be so denominated. The finrand traded on world markets, while 
the commercial rand, the currency used within South Africa and in transactions of 
trade in goods, was valued by the South African Reserve Bank. The finrand could be 
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converted at a discount to the commercial rand, imposing a tax on the export of 
capital and on the withdrawal of foreign capital already in the country. Despite this, 
net outflow of capital continued after the introduction of the financial rand.124  
 The facilitation of the two rand system required a massive bureaucratic effort, 
and opened up new and lucrative avenues of graft. By no means should the dual rand, 
as constituted and regulated in South Africa, be considered a panacea for currency 
instability and capital flight. The Reserve Bank did not stop (and often participated 
in) ‘currency roundtripping’, whereby Afrikaner banks purchased financial rand on 
the world market, only to have the funds miraculously reappear on their books as 
commercial rand in the same nominal quantity. The Witwatersrand attorney general 
found in 1999 that all transactions approved by the Reserve Bank of R300 million and 
larger were tainted by such dealings.125   
 But was there a convincing case for the unification of the two rands in 1995? 
The answer appears to be no. In 1994, the World Bank counseled the government to 
unify the two rands when “the gap between the financial rand and the commercial 
rand [had] narrowed consistently to a sufficiently small differential.”126 Indeed, the 
finrand hovered at 90% of the value of the commercial rand during the three weeks 
that preceded the decision to scrap the dual exchange rate regime. And yet, not even 
one year had passed since the day (April 10, 1994) that the financial rand had traded 
at the lowest level since its introduction. To assume that less than a year of rand 
stability predicted a rand able to withstand the future vagaries of the international 
forex markets was dubious at best. Finance Minster Chris Liebenberg, SARB 
governor Chris Stals, and those that agreed with him in the ANC intended, by lifting 
this potent capital control, to prove that South Africa could face the international 
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market nose to nose and survive. The ANC wished to be an exemplary state in the 
eyes of the IFIs and international finance. Regarding capital controls they largely 
succeeded, even if the domestic effects have been largely negative thus far (despite 
claims to the contrary). 
 
 B. The Effects of International Market Exposure 
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 Chris Stals and Chris Liebenberg declared the end of the financial rand on 
March 13, 1995. The move was not unexpected, although the moment was not 
revealed until shortly before it occurred. Nearly a year later, Stals appeared 
triumphantly before the SARB board of governors to make his annual report on the 
state of monetary policy. The rand had remained relatively stable, appreciating 
smoothly (5.1% net gain against the US dollar) since the rubbishing of the dual 
exchange rate. Positive net capital flows reached R22 billion in 1995, and Stals 
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declared 1995 an unqualified monetary success.127 Even though R9 billion of this 
inflow represented short term bank transactions, Stals insisted that equity investment 
by foreigners be considered good faith medium to long-term commitments. Stals 
rounded out the speech by calling for further liberalization of financial markets, to 
contribute to their “self-regulation”.128   
 According to the banker Bruggemans, himself a subscriber to most precepts of 
neoliberalism (remarking that “obviously: exchange controls are not an effective 
policy tool”), the SARB was thoroughly “steeped in monetarist thinking by the mid 
1990’s.”129 As such, the Reserve Bank believed investors only temporary fallible; in 
short order, equilibrating forces would act to bring the rand close to its ‘true value’ in 
the event of destabilization. But by the end of 1996, speculators had assailed the rand, 
and no short term corrective forces were evident. Between February 15 and April 16, 
1996, the rand depreciated by 18% against the US dollar. The Reserve Bank’s public 
statement following the announcement of a 1% interest rate hike in mid-April 
expresses concern that “the rand [could] now be justifiably called an undervalued 
currency.” It goes on to warn that: 
 
 This step by the Reserve Bank, which is in line with current developments in 
 the money and capital markets, may not be completely compatible with recent 
 trends in the domestic economy. For the time being, however, it has become a 
 first priority to restore some stability in the foreign exchange market.130   
 
GDP per capita grew at just 2% in 1996, after a very slow 1995 (0.9% growth).131 
This was not encouraging for an economy still producing far below full capacity, 
despite its improving fundamentals. The SARB did not deny that from a purely 
domestic standpoint, the spring of 1996 was not the correct time to raise interest rates. 
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Stals spent over R5 billion (~$1.2 billion) in foreign exchange that spring in a futile 
effort to defend the rand. But he could not appear too unsettled; after all, he had 
lobbied assiduously for the end of the financial rand.  
 South Africa was granted less than two years of respite before the storm 
struck again during the worldwide crisis of 1997/98. The financial bedlam born of the 
panic of investors operating in East Asia punished South Africa with all the force of 
the well-wired late 90’s financial markets. At the pinnacle of the crisis, investors did 
not pull out of South African equities; in fact, equity prices actually rose slightly 
during the period. They did, however, flood the bond market, causing a disastrous dip 
in bond prices. The Reserve Bank chalked this up to a “general decision to reduce 
exposure to fixed-interest bearing bonds in emerging markets.”132 Meanwhile, neither 
the Reserve Bank, President Mandela, nor Finance Minister Manuel questioned 
publicly whether the removal of capital controls had been premature. 
   More than R13 billion fled the country in 1998, despite that the SARB both 
spent R8 billion defending the currency and raised up real interest rates to above 20% 
by the end of the third quarter. The rand experienced a 28% nominal depreciation 
against the dollar between March and September 1998, turning a “justifiably 
undervalued” currency into a true lightweight. The Reserve Bank intervened in 
foreign exchange markets with dogged persistence, squandering billions of rand in a 
fruitless effort to dissuade speculation. The economy contracted by 1.8% per capita in 
1998, depressed by currency crisis and high interest rates.133  
 South African economic policy followed most of the guidelines laid out by the 
IFIs and their patrons for response to capital flight; it raised interest rates to 
discourage withdrawal, did not decree new capital controls, and refrained from 
issuing inflammatory threats. The SARB did flout IFI prescription in exchange 
market intervention, resulting in accusations of disequilibrating “dirty floating”. 
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During the crisis of 2001, the monetary authorities would retreat almost entirely from 
the market, allowing the rand to fall even more precipitously than in 1998, but 
keeping interest rates at levels more reasonable for the domestic context. 
 Moreover, the contagion of 1998 struck a South African state in the midst of 
faithful implementation of the much applauded GEAR program. According to the 
World Bank, GEAR was specifically designed to assuage the fears that international 
finance harbored about South Africa fundamentals: 
 
 In 1996, faced with external pressures and instability in the Rand, and 
 concerns over the commitment to sound macroeconomic policies, the 
 government introduced GEAR. To restore confidence and enhance credibility, 
 GEAR built upon the strategic vision set out in the RDP by committing 
 government to specific macro targets.134 
 
One notes that the Bank does not mention here a real need for a retooled economic 
program, but only a perceived need. Nor does the Bank offer elsewhere evidence that 
the domestic context demanded such reforms. GEAR, which will be examined in 
greater depth in the following chapter, endeavored to favorably influence perceptions 
among international and domestic investors. Despite these strident belt-tightening 
efforts, investors and economists still managed to identify gaps in policy that they 
interpreted as showing low aptitude in monetary regulation. Trevor Alleyne, an IMF 
economist who worked at the South Africa desk between 1998 and 2000, told the 
author in an interview that South Africa turned the international contagion of 1998 
into a domestic problem; the Reserve Bank “improperly” gave unclear signals to the 
market with its interest rate policy, having little prior experience with ‘managing’ 
foreign investors.135 The learning curve in the forex game was very steep. 
 As the 1998 and 2001 crises proved, South Africa’s carefully designed period 
of austerity failed in its primary mission. Top ANC and Reserve Bank officials were 
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not oblivious to this (although COSATU leaders sometimes were). Even in 1997, 
after the first comparatively mild ‘rand event’, Chris Stals was already complaining 
of investor myopia. In a February 1997 speech to investors and government officials 
at a conference sponsored by the banking outfit Frankel Pollak, Stals accused 
investors of “reacting wildly” to rumors.136 The rumor of which he spoke was one 
that circulated through the novel conduit of e-mail in early 1996. This gossip 
purported that Nelson Mandela was ill. While later rebuked, many suspect that this 
snippet triggered the speculative attack on the rand.137 
 Even more unexpected than those that preceded it was the rand devaluation 
and capital flight of 2001. In 1999, Tito Mboweni took over from Chris Stals as 
Governor of the SARB. He had been deputy chief of economic planning during the 
ANC’s late exile period. With his ascension, blacks penetrated the last of the bastion 
held by a member of the old guard. There was continuity, however, in the treatment 
of the rand, with capital controls being slowly relaxed (even in 2001, South African 
residents could not fully participate in currency markets, although foreign actors 
could). In early 2000, the value of the rand stood at ~6.05/ dollar. By August of 2001, 
it had slipped to R8.45/ dollar. Then the real shock occurred; by Christmas 2001, the 
rand had fallen to 13.85/ dollar. While the rand has rebounded over the past four 
years to reach a fairly stable range of between 6 and 7 rand per dollar, the causes 
2001 crisis remain unknown.  
 Or rather, this experience served to prove that currency markets are vulnerable 
to panics unconstrained by individual country fundamentals. The speculative attack 
on the rand in 2001 cannot be viably chalked up to anything other than financial 
sector herd mentality and the associated cultural aspects of financial careers (bankers 
may experience disapprobation if they do not ride the upswing, but are not blamed 
individually at the point of the crash). In 2003, IMF Chief Economist and Cape Town 
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native Kenneth Rogoff granted the Mail and Guardian an interview while visiting 
relatives in South Africa. He spoke of the rand crisis of 2001, saying that “the rand 
may have been following the Australian and New Zealand dollars, ‘commodity 
currencies’ that experienced steep losses earlier.”138 Undeniably, South Africa’s terms 
of trade had deteriorated since the beginning of 2000, due to falling commodity 
prices. But this hardly explains such a traumatic depreciation. The recent IMF tome 
on the South African post-apartheid economy ascribes part of the blame for the 2001 
crisis to the slow pace of privatization. In fact, this pace was not exceptionally slow, 
as will be seen in chapter 7. However, the IMF avers that international investors were 
disquieted by delays in the offering of Telkom (telecommunications), sparking flight 
and speculative attack.139 This is difficult to substantiate, but only further hints at the 
connection between the rand crisis and irrational speculative panic. 
 By the late 1990’s, South Africa had been lauded for its work in many 
spheres, especially in its efforts to reduce government debt. The government 
hawkishly curtailed spending until it had pushed the fiscal deficit to below 1% of 
GDP in 2000. The SARB was applauded for its effort to reduce its ‘net forward book’ 
exposure (holding of contracts to buy currencies in the future), shrinking these 
commitments from real $28 billion in 1998 to $4 billion by 2001.140 Rogoff qualified 
his statement about the 2001 crisis by admitting that “one of the most striking facts 
about exchange rates is that the reasons for their movements are hard to explain after 
the fact.”141 Nevertheless, Rogoff argued the exchange controls were “unambiguously 
bad”, and that the 2001 rand crisis was a worthwhile price to pay for a flexible 
exchange rate. Why this is the case in South Africa is not easily discernible. 
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 Rogoff’s views reflect the perspective of what were still clearly the dominant 
factions within the IFIs in 2001. Certainly there were dissenters within the 
institutions; in 2003 would appear Joseph Stiglitz’s Globalization and Its Discontents, 
challenging the ‘unambiguity’ of the negative impact of capital controls. Rogoff, in 
the interview quoted above, accused Stiglitz of making claims that were “at best, 
highly controversial, and at worst, akin to pedaling snake oil.”  
 Notwithstanding this internal conflict, the World Bank and IMF promoted the 
liberalization of all capital controls in South Africa between 1990 and 2001. Dr. 
Alleyne told the author that even though the IMF hailed progress in loosening capital 
controls, it privately nudged South Africa to quicken the pace, especially before 
1998.142 Today, the IFIs tend to look back at the experience of capital liberalization 
through a revisionist prism; the 2005 IMF Article IV- South Africa consultation 
remarks, without qualification, that South Africa’s flexible exchange rate has served 
the country well.143 
 Many questions then arise about the ANC’s rationale for scraping the 
financial rand and reducing other controls. Did officials really believe that the rand 
would be stable at a time when the world’s collective view of South Africa was 
clouded by the violence of the end of apartheid era? Was the ANC unaware of the 
implications of capital flight, à la Mexico in 1994-1995? Furthermore, what reason 
did the ANC have to believe that FDI inflows would exceed flight of domestic South 
African capital?  
 On the last count, inflows did technically exceed outflows between 1995 and 
2001. But there is more to this story; most of the inflows were of a speculative nature. 
COSATU, in response to the release of 2000 budget, exhibited concern that foreign 
investment other than portfolio transactions registered a net outflow of R21.6 billion 
($3.5 billion) in 1999.144 Finance minister Manuel loosened laws that bound ‘national 
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companies’ to be headquartered in South Africa and be traded on South African 
exchanges during his first year in office. By 2000, De Beers, Anglo American, and 
South African Breweries, three of the largest conglomerates, had decamped to 
London. Two traded on the London exchange, and De Beers delisted entirely. In 
1998, the effect alone of De Beers and Anglo American leaving the country in which 
they collected most of their revenue drew down the value of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange by 12%. 
 Strangely enough, this may have squared with the ANC’s wishes. According 
to political economist Hein Marais: 
 
 Foreign investors [in South Africa] eyeing post-1994 opportunities found an 
 economy dominated by sprawling local corporations, leaving little space for 
 bulky foreign entrants. By encouraging offshore investments, government 
 hoped to create ‘space’ in the economy.145 
 
The ANC placed the same faith in international investors as many of their 
counterparts in Sub-Saharan Africa had in the 1980’s; they believed that South 
Africa, with its relatively developed industrial base, would succeed where poorer 
nations had failed. It did not succeed to the degree that Mandela, Manuel, and Mbeki 
had hoped. The reasons for this are not precisely clearl, but there are many plausible 
options: poor apartheid-era social infrastructure, poorly trained workers, a capital 
equipment glut, crime, anti-African bias of international investors, and fear of union 
power. A 2003 article in Foreign Direct Investment, a publication of the Financial 
Times (London) expressed bewilderment at the low level of foreign interest in South 
Africa.146 Londoners, in fact, appeared to be the only ones with any interest; three 
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quarters of all FDI in South Africa now comes from the UK (home to over a million 
South African expatriates).147 
 And the price was high, coming in the form of the currency crises described 
above. The South African elite held nonetheless to the doctrine that once capital 
controls were lifted, they could be not be reinstated. They were a ‘new reality’ in a 
new South Africa.  
 The only explanation for this is that, again, a yearning to ‘play with the big 
boys’ overshadowed more calculated planning at the top echelon of the ANC 
leadership. The unification of the two rands was a crucial piece of this puzzle. It was 
only at the highest levels of the ANC that discussion of such things as capital account 
liberalization occurred; the ANC rank-and-file reveled in its victory over apartheid 
for the balance of the 1990’s and paid little attention to ‘technical’ but consequential 
decisions.  
 One must ask why COSATU so quietly endured the adjustment to a 
liberalized capital regime. The answer is found in COSATU’s weak capacity; only a 
few of its top officials and intellectuals understood the ramifications of the new 
currency regime. COSATU leaders had little education in matters of international 
finance. Most of them rose up through the organization from the shop floors of an 
apartheid South Africa largely cut off from the world. In 2002, at COSATU’s urging, 
the government opened a judicial inquiry into the 2001 run on the rand. Union leaders 
suspected that “illegal and unethical activities” contributed to the fall and that “the 
perpetrators must be brought to book.”148 In COSATU’s public statement 
encouraging the prosecution of financial wrong-doers, the union seems confounded 
over why the rand was attacked. The investigation concluded with no indictments; 
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There was nothing technically illegal about betting against the rand within a system 
of open capital flows.  
 The COSATU statement does, however, suggest erecting ‘road bumps’ in the 
path of footloose capital, an idea already anathema to the leaders of the ANC. There 
has always been some questioning of the decision to remove capital controls. In 
February 1997, the respected Mail and Guardian published an article titled “South 
Africa’s Exchange Controls- Easy Does It”. It warns that: 
 
 [South Africa] certainly hasn’t reached a stage [at which it is safe to further 
 loosen capital controls]- neither the fundamentals nor the sentiment is strong 
 enough to deter massive capital flight. Which begs the question- why lift 
 exchange controls at all?...The overriding rationale seems to be political- a 
 desire to integrate South Africa into the global economy…Abolishing controls 
 would signal that South Africa has grown up.149  
 
James Heintz, a researcher at the labor-sponsored National Labour and Economic 
Development Institute (NALEDI) contributed heavily to this article. He points out 
that South Africa should have waited until employment and social stability had 
increased before subjecting the economy to the potentially painful adjustments of a 
floating currency. At the point where the (brief) debate over the future of the finrand 
ended in decision to combine the two rands, little COSATU input was heard. The 
‘social movement union’ was reinventing itself as a more ‘workerist’ union, preparing 
to concentrate more upon labor issues and less upon political ones (if such a 
distinction can be made). It did not identify capital controls as a priority. Instead, it 
perceived its stock as high-and-rising in the wake of the Labour Relations Act of 
1995. Its officials (including COSATU intellectual Tito Mboweni, the future SARB 
Governor) served as ministers in the Government of National Unity. 
 Meanwhile, top ANC officials and other members of the reconstituted South 
African elite acted as if the scrapping of the financial rand had been inevitable. In the 
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same Mail and Guardian article quoted above, economist Pieter Laubscher of the 
University of Stellenbosch comments: 
 
 As the experience since the abolition of the financial rand has shown us, 
 financial volatility is a new reality in South Africa. It will be countered to the 
 extent that the authorities implement credible, stable, and transparent and 
 consistent policies.150 
 
Laubscher makes no acknowledgement of option number two (albeit a difficult one): 
the resurrection of capital controls. Many among the ANC and their advisors saw 
capital market development as a one way street. As the next chapter will demonstrate, 
once the idea that capital markets can be directly controlled had disappeared, the only 
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 A. Fashioning GEAR  
 
 Even before the implementation of the RDP, forces had begun to align 
themselves against the GNU’s strategy. South Africa’s business community, along 
with the IMF and the World Bank, envisaged a somewhat different development track 
for the country. In 1995, the liberalization of capital controls had bared South Africa 
to the power of international finance. As the dominant ANC faction would not 
consider a reversal of these measures, many other groups began to ponder a new 
policy they hoped would both promote domestic growth and assuage investors.  
 South African business, a wary participant in RDP proceedings, acted first. In 
February of 1996, the South Africa Foundation, more or less a reincarnation of the 
old South African Chamber of Commerce, released a document titled Growth for All. 
It included all the trappings of the most rigorously neoliberal adjustment programs. 
The document began with a diagram titled “How Economies Grow”, a theory based 
upon success in four areas: ‘policies encouraging foreign capital’ (reduction of capital 
controls), ‘policies encouraging domestic saving’ (lower asset and corporate taxes), 
‘policies encouraging labor absorption’ (curtailment of wage growth and more 
flexible labor regulations), and ‘effective education and training programs’.151 
Opening with a quote by the economist Jeffrey Sachs, the document demonstrated the 
South Africa Foundation’s acumen in creating the illusion that actors across the 
middle of the ideological spectrum supported its mission. 
 It also demonstrated the advantage of being the first mover; the SAF’s report 
would be used by somewhat overwhelmed ANC officials as a jumping off point for 
the retooling of economic policy. The unions operated in 1995 and 1996 under the 
impression that the RDP would define policy in perpetuity. The SAF’s document  
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directly challenged that notion with its recommendations for labor market reform. It 
proposed a ‘two-tier’ labor market; one for those already employed (governed by the 
existing regulations), and a more ‘flexible’ market for new hires in which employers 
could fire workers for any ‘commercial’ reason with no advanced notice and in which 
there would be no minimum wages (there was no national minimum wage, but labor 
had negotiated minimum wages in many sectors).152 COSATU did not directly 
respond to this document, despite that it quickly began to provoke discussion within 
the ANC. With mounting rand instability as the backdrop, the SAF report was the 
rock upon which GEAR would be built.153 
 A small team, led by newly inaugurated Finance Minister Manuel and Deputy 
President Mbeki, assembled in early 1996 to draft what would come to be known as 
the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution program. While President Mandela was 
aware of the project, he would have very little input until late in the process.154 
Instead, Moss Ngoasheng, a famous freedom fighter and Mbeki loyalist in the Deputy 
President’s office, would be the ANC executive representative present during all 
negotiations.  
 The ANC economics department, still understaffed in 1996, tapped a group of 
outside economists to do most of the work on GEAR.155 This team was comprised of 
analysts from many spheres, but all were of one ideological bent: a slightly tempered 
neoliberalism. These included two economists from the University of Stellenbosch, 
the traditional seat of the Afrikaner intelligentsia (although not the more extreme 
factions of Afrikanerdom). Otherwise, the core panel was comprised of two officials 
of the Development Bank of Southern Africa,156 two professors from the University 
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of Cape Town and one from the University of Durban, one official from each of the 
ministries of Labour, Finance, and Trade and Industry, two Reserve Bank economists, 
and two World Bank economists.157 There were no COSATU or SACP 
representatives in the room. The ANC released the document on June 14, 1996, as a 
fait accompli.  
 Mandela and Mbeki masked the great transformation embodied by GEAR by 
claiming that it merely used numerical targets to build upon the RDP. COSATU 
elicited a confused response to this perfidy, and betrayed its own partial seduction by 
the free market ethos assaulting it from Pretoria and abroad. In 1996, the union 
movement released the Social Equity and Job Creation document, marking the first 
time that it tacitly endorsed certain liberal prescriptions. This might not be evident 
upon a first reading. However, it focuses on supply-side management at the expense 
of demand, changing the analytical framework from Keynesian to neoclassical.158 It 
thus marks a disconnect from RDP discourse and sets the stage for COSATU’s 
conflicted acceptance of GEAR.  
 
 B. GEAR Targets: Quantitative and Ideological 
 
 Contrary to RDP practice, GEAR delineated numerical targets in nearly every 
area. It drew its predictions from pieces of three econometric models; one created by 
the SARB in the early 1990’s, one by economists at the University of Stellenbosch, 
and one by the World Bank. These returned fairly rosy results, given adherence to 
certain rules (and a healthy dose of fortune). The GEAR-less scenario projections, 
based on an extrapolation of 1995 RDP-based policies, predicted that growth would 
stagnate at about 3% annually in the medium term, that inflation would not fall below 
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9% (inflation ran at ~8% in 1995), and that growth of the labor force would outpace 
employment growth by as much as 1.5% annually.159 The model assumed that, in the 
absence of a new program, the private savings rate would not rise and current account 
deficits would not fall. Amazingly, the ANC did not encounter much resistance to its 
pretension that these model predictions were entirely objective. 
 After accounting for GEAR’s adjustments, the model returned a brighter 
statistical set. GDP growth would rise to 6.1% by 2000, inflation would fall to 7.6%, 
employment growth would skyrocket to 4.3% annually, and manufacturing exports 
would increase by 12.5% per year. An alluring program, indeed.  
 GEAR demanded better facilitation of private sector growth, which would 
henceforth play the lead role in economic expansion. A 1996 UN report duly asserted 
that “GEAR closely resembles an IMF structural adjustment program”, although in 
this case, the program was self imposed.160 GEAR itself threatened that if South 
Africa did not tighten its monetary policy, a structural adjustment program would 
“become inevitable.”161 It calls for fiscal contraction and a period of austerity; one 
that would lay the track on which future growth would ride. Austerity meant cutting 
the budget deficit (which stood at a still fairly bloated 5% in 1996), “careful 
management of the government wage bill”, scaling back of government services that 
could be provided by the private sector, and “reduction of the distorting impact of 
excessive rates of tax” (a less progressive tax code).162 In the labor market, GEAR 
envisages greater flexibility. This flexibility is responsible for nearly half of the job 
growth predicted by GEAR’s econometric model between 1996 and 2000.  
 GEAR relied upon a very optimistic view of the private sector response to the 
new program. According to a study by a South African consultancy, overall average 
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corporate taxes decreased from 48% to 30% between 1994 and 1999.163 This tax 
relief occurred partially in order to satisfy GEAR stipulations. And yet, real private 
investment growth performed abysmally during the first five years of the GEAR era; 
it ran at 5.9% in 1995, but averaged only 2.5% between 1996 and 2000.164 Between 
1996 and 2000, the SARB held real interest rates at double, on average, what they had 
been between 1990 and 1995. 
 Foreign direct investment continued to perform quite tepidly as well. These 
numbers are the single most powerful indictment of GEAR. Given South Africa’s 
factor endowments, most observers were perplexed, by 1996, at the lack of foreign 
interest, particularly in the heavy manufacturing sector. Was not GEAR a strategy 
tailored to address the concerns of foreign investors? While applauded, GEAR did not 
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Foreign Direct Investment: South Africa (Inflows and Outflows- Millions of US 
Dollars)  
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  
  
As seen in the chart above, FDI outflows from South Africa have eclipsed inflows in 
three different years since GEAR’s promulgation. 2001 appears anomalous; severe 
depreciation in the value of the rand lowered the price of certain South African 
investments (such as in land improvement), causing a brief spike in net FDI. But the 
overall numbers speak for themselves. FDI has remained very weak.    
 GEAR also presumed was that domestic business would ‘rationally’ react to 
the government’s newly binding macroeconomic commitments by forgoing exporting 
capital to invest at home. They did the opposite; the large conglomerates invested 
heavily in Indonesia, Australia, Brazil, Ghana, China, and New Zealand, among 
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others.165 The ANC may have decided to employ in the late 1990’s a dubious strategy 
of ‘making room’ in the economy by encouraging the domestic conglomerates to 
invest abroad in ‘peripheral’ investment categories. Increased FDI would supposedly 
more than compensate. Once again, rand instability deserves some blame. But the 
balance is borne by foreign investor’s lack of interest in South Africa, despite GEAR. 
 How did the economy perform overall compared to GEAR’s expectations? In 
short, quite poorly. Employment figures tell much of the story. GEAR predicted 
annual employment growth averaging 2.9%. The actual figure was -2.1%.166 South 
Africa hemorrhaged jobs while the Reserve Bank ratcheted up interest rates, the rand 
rode a rollercoaster, and the government curtailed spending. GEAR placed much faith 
in the power of an increase in ‘credibility’ to occasion an investment boom, reflecting 
the strict pro-market perspective of the GEAR drafters. One of the incidental effects 
of GEAR (or perhaps intentional for some people), was that it permanently relegated 
the labor movement to the sidelines of policy making.  
  
 C. The Power of Numbers and the Legacy of GEAR 
 
 At COSATU’s Sixth Congress in September of 1997, the union movement 
condemned GEAR. It howled that GEAR “undermined union solidarity”, exposing 
unions to the frigid liberal winds blown by such bodies as the IMF and the WTO.167 
COSATU delegates motioned during the congress that GEAR be officially considered 
“anti-developmental”. Yet, tellingly, the member unions did not vote to demand that 
the government rescind GEAR. Instead, they took a wait-and-see attitude, promising 
to revisit the issue if the predicted benefits did not materialize.168 When that became 
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evident, COSATU’s weakness precluded its ability to win a new dispensation. 
COSATU’s suffered, in the first instance, from a dearth of institutional capacity. 
COSATU central never effectively rallied member unions to take mass action against 
GEAR. Later they would succeed in organizing mass stay-aways to protest 
privatization, but mid-level union leaders did not rank GEAR very highly on the list 
of immediate concerns. Instead, member unions often appended complaints about 
GEAR as afterthoughts to more narrowly targeted entreaties.  
 Secondly, COSATU misunderstood the forces that caused GEAR’s failure. 
The ANC manipulated this. It sowed confusion about the ramifications of GEAR and 
effectively paralyzed COSATU’s response. In late 1996, the ANC distributed a 
document called GEAR, the RDP, and the Role of the State to all ANC provincial and 
local officials. It was intended to be a ‘GEAR primer’. The document betrays the 
ANC’s largely successful efforts to cloud the nature of GEAR through use of 
deceptive rhetoric. It reads: 
 
 In isolation, certain measures of GEAR are similar to many neoliberal 
 packages… [This is due to the] objective character of certain economic 
 relations.169 
 
Of course, none of these relations are objective, and the comment is a flagrant 
example of globalization-made-me-do-it. But the idea has proved persuasive enough 
within the lower tiers of the ANC and the labor movement that it has successfully 
shielded GEAR from sustained attack from the left. Just as the ANC framed its 
decision to unite the two rands as ‘inevitable’ and ‘objective’, so it has characterized 
GEAR as nothing more than an unalterable fact of post-apartheid life.  
 If the ANC had hashed out the ideas behind GEAR with its alliance partners, 
this approach would have failed. However, the ANC courted controversy by 
developing GEAR secretly, but managed to avoid potentially embarrassing 
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recriminations from its allies. Stephen Gelb, an economist involved in drawing up 
GEAR, described the process thus: 
 
 Close affinity with the ‘Washington Consensus’ characterized not only the 
 substantive policy recommendations of GEAR, but also the process through 
 which it was formulated…This was ‘reform from above’ with a 
 vengeance…170  
 
The fact that the ANC could disguise GEAR as purely technical, and that COSATU 
would not vociferously question that assumption, says much about the relative 
competence of the two organizations. Even more revealing is a 1999 survey 
conducted by the University of the Witwatersrand’s Sociology of Work center. It 
found that 67% of COSATU members had never even heard of GEAR.171 
 By 1998, the ANC had made great strides in its offensive against anti-GEAR 
activists in its own ranks and within COSATU. At the SACP’s 10th congress, held in 
1998, Mandela warned COSATU and its communist ally that he “would not accept” 
criticism of GEAR in the contemporary climate of currency instability.172 COSATU 
appeared to buckle. The Sixth Union Congress in 1997 was the first in which no 
member union tabled a resolution to withdraw from the alliance. COSATU central 
had established greater control over its members while losing clout in Pretoria. 
 Although COSATU has not been sidelined without protest, the predominant 
powers within the movement refuse to entertain the notion of a schism with the ANC. 
In 2001, only three months before COSATU called on members to paralyze industry 
over the threat of further privatization, COSATU president Willie Madisha put it 
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thus: “[analogously, one] does not talk of changing an employer if we find ourselves 
[in an unfavorable situation].”173  
 But COSATU has still made public its consternation. Many of the strikes 
recently sponsored by COSATU have represented animosity directed at the ANC as 
well as employers. A mass stay away in the fall of 2005 featured complaints that 10 
years of GEAR had generated corporate tax breaks but had done little to increase the 
employment rate.174 
 COSATU took particular exception to a “conclave” held in 2000 in Pretoria, 
which aimed to “stiffen the resolve” of ANC planners in the implementation of 
GEAR.175 President Mbeki hosted World Bank President James Wolfensohn, IMF 
Deputy Managing Director Eduardo Aninat, Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin, 
and a group of American economists, among others. Mbeki and co. discussed 
strategies for ‘tighter implementation’ of GEAR, including more tax concessions to 
encourage the heretofore weak level of FDI.176 No representatives of labor were 
invited. It would be wrong to claim that these meetings were merely talk shops for 
reactionary neoliberals; the participants debated faithfully the reasons for the failure 
of GEAR up until that point and decided to change tack slightly in preparation for a 
renewed push. Measures were discussed to strengthen property laws, holes in which 
had made it possible for white landowners to pressure black beneficiaries of 
redistribution into resale, and to erect capital controls on the model of Chile’s 
(although this was quickly dropped).177 Even if the meetings had produced labor-
friendly reforms, labor was not at the table and therefore would have had no input 
into the process. COSATU had not, and would not, regain the presence that it had 
before GEAR. 
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 D. The Allure of Acceptance? 
 
 At another level, the 2000 conference exemplifies the ANC’s relationship, or 
perhaps desired relationship, with the IFIs and the international financial community. 
The ANC has quietly reveled in the respect that GEAR has garnered it internationally. 
These meetings may have been more than a means to an end for Thabo Mbeki, they 
may have been an end in themselves. In 10 years, the ANC leadership had gone from 
cramped offices in Lusaka to shaking hands with the president of the World Bank and 
internationally renowned economists. Such psychological effects are impossible to 
measure, but the pattern traced by this paper makes one suspect that they inform 
economic decisions taken by the ANC. In a 2005 interview with the business weekly 
the Financial Mail, advisory consultant and GEAR drafter Iraj Abedian exemplifies 
the pride in South Africa’s macro accomplishments: 
 
 Manuel has done what many other countries that have been at it for much 
 longer have failed to do- get their fiscal book in order. South American 
 countries have been at it for much longer, and they still haven’t managed to 
 achieve what we have…Putting long term goals ahead of short term political 
 expediency is something few governments have been able to do.178 
  
According to the banker Cees Bruggemans, ANC officials have long been excited 
about the prospect of South Africa becoming the second African country (after 
Botswana) to earn an A level credit rating from Moody’s (although it has not yet done 
so).179 These are the types of signals that the ANC interprets to mean that non-white 
South Africa has proven its mettle.  
 In 1999, South Africa hosted UNCTAD IX (the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development). Reportedly, President Mbeki expended much energy 
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ensuring that South Africa would be classified a ‘developed country’ at the 
conference.180 As referenced in chapter 1, the World Bank and IMF honored Manuel 
by inviting him to chair the 2000 WB/IMF annual meetings in Prague. The ANC has 
striven for inclusion and acceptance among international elites, and has largely 
achieved it.  
 Newly confident after approbation of GEAR, the ANC has begun to invest 
more energy in its relationship with other international bodies, particularly the WTO. 
GEAR guidelines more than fulfilled South Africa’s WTO requirements.181 Since 
South Africa’s ascension to the body at its creation in 1995, it has been among the 
most active and enthusiastic members in terms of invoking anti-dumping clauses, 
usually against developed countries. The WTO provides a forum in which South 
Africa can stand as a supposed equal of developed nations. South Africa’s support for 
a puissant WTO is not all posturing; the country is an agricultural exporter poised to 
benefit greatly from an opening of European, American, and Japanese agricultural 
regimes. Nonetheless, a certain amount of the ANC’s enthusiasm for the WTO stems 
from the hope that a ‘rules-based system’ will highlight what the ANC (and 
particularly President Mbeki)182 considers one of its great strengths: its ability to play 
by the rules. 
 COSATU has not always stood quietly by when the ANC has embraced 
international institutions. COSATU Secretary-General Vavi delivered a biting speech 
at the WTO summit in Hong Kong this past December, saying: 
  
 Little did we know that [South Africa joined in 1994] a world that uses laws 
 and complex regulations to practice an apartheid system over which we 
 [already once] triumphed. This global apartheid uses its parliaments, such as 
 the U.N. Security Council and the WTO, where our voices are excluded or 
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 marginalized. It establishes unfair rules that worsen our poverty and 
 unemployment...183  
 
COSATU leverages such opportunities as these to take indirect swipes at the ANC’s 
coziness with international institutions. Yet while the union leadership vilifies the 
international system with broad strokes, it does not often engage with the ANC in 
detailed discussion of IFI reform.184 This should be interpreted as another sign of the 
union movement’s poor awareness of the implications of IFI involvement in South 
Africa. Furthermore, COSATU does not use such fiery rhetoric against its ally, 
despite that the ANC has promulgated some of the policies that Vavi calls practices of 
‘global apartheid’. COSATU leaders have been uneasy about the possibility of a 
permanent rift with the ANC, fearing that they will lose what privileges they still 
retain. 
  
 E. Whither GEAR? 
 
 Will self-sacrifice in South Africa ever pay off? Murmurs of a revival are 
being heard currently, but it remains to be seen whether these prove permanent. 
While the ANC supervised strict macro regulation, as prescribed by GEAR, the 
economy performed poorly. While GEAR predicted GDP growth of 4.2% annually 
between 1996 and 2000, it averaged 2.5%. With population growth of over 2%, 
incomes remained stagnant (not to mention that GEAR’s final acronymic tenet, 
redistribution, has been absent). The government did not even manage to reach the 
growth rates in public spending envisaged by GEAR (which predicted growth of 
7.4% annually), instead interpreting the program such that keeping budget deficits 
down superceded growth of infrastructure and services spending in importance.  
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 During the past two or three years, there have surfaced signs of a possible 
economic turnaround, and the ANC may yet claim vindication. While growth has 
remained relatively tepid at around 3% between 2002 and 2004, other indicators have 
improved. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, it is outside the scope of this paper to 
make a blanket condemnation of GEAR. Inflation has come down. Real interest rates 
were more than 4% lower on average in 2004 than in 1998 (1998 being, however, the 
year in which the SARB attempted to prevent capital flight through interest rate 
hikes).185 Austerity, along with improved tax collection, permitted the Ministry of 
Finance to lower the fiscal deficit to 0.8% of GDP by 2001. In 2003, Manuel felt 
comfortable in loosening the reins and allowed the deficit to rise to 2.5% of GDP. It is 
expected that the government will allow the deficit to steady at between 3 and 4% of 
GDP.186  The ANC has tempered its obsession with fiscal targets, and the thrust of the 
budget is set to become somewhat more redistributive. Perhaps increased foreign 
investment will follow after all. Time and again, South Africans point out that their 
state provides investors services not present in many developing countries, including 
a judiciary system that rigorously upholds property rights and reliable energy 
supplies.187  
 However, most of the once imagined benefits of GEAR have not materialized. 
Currency crises, as examined in chapter 5, must be partially blamed for this failure. 
The ANC must too shoulder some of the blame. In the mid 1990’s, it failed to 
comprehend that, in a small open economy, liberalization of capital flows can bring 
both increased FDI and erratic capital movements precipitated by panic. Of course, 
South Africa’s struggles partially lie outside the jurisdiction of the Finance Minister 
Manuel, particularly in the devastation wrought by HIV/AIDS. One must be cautious 
in blaming GEAR for the nation’s woes. One can, however, state without controversy 
                                                 
185 World Bank Development Indicators 
186 Paton, Carol, and Claire Bisseker. “Trevor Manuel: Numbers and Nous” Financial Mail 
Johannesburg: February 25, 2005. 
187 Business Day “Is South Africa Ready for Investors?- Interview with Ravi Naidoo” 
Johannesburg: December 13, 2005. 
 
 78 
that it has not accelerated South Africa to its potential speed. What should be 
examined, then, is how the ANC has held together the alliance with labor, despite 
years of unrealized promises. 
 Recently, pieces have appeared in the ANC press celebrating the ‘renewed 
strength’ of the ANC-COSATU alliance. In 2003, Thabo Mbeki authored an airy 
message in the ANC newsletter The ANC Today, declaring the alliance between 
African labor and the ANC a “natural outcome of the evolution of [South African] 
society.”188 This reads as an entreaty to COSATU to desist in its posturing. It also 
reflects the ANC view that a small dose of well directed praise will placate the union 
movement. COSATU’s policy research institute, NALEDI, conducted a series of 
surveys in 2003; one showed that 1 of 3 COSATU members supported a rupture with 
the ANC, while another indicated that more than 80% of members supported the 
overall program of the governing party.189 This confusion mirrors the general 
inconsistency of COSATU policy declarations.  
 The ANC has exploited the rhetorical weak spots in COSATU’s armor. In 
more technical matters such as monetary management, fiscal debt regulation, and 
trade policy, the ANC has defaulted to occidental norms, claiming that it has little 
choice. This is a fallacy. Certain officials within the ANC understand that the choice 
to liberalize capital flows necessitated reforms targeted at the stabilization of 
international markets. Officials understand too that these decisions were neither 
objective nor inevitable. But they are not so easily reversed, and liberalization not 
easily resisted. The IFIs have settled in as expert guides in the transition toward this 
new South African system. Contrary to the analysis offered by some of their shriller 
critics, the IFIs did not arrive in South Africa with the intention of breaking labor 
through manipulation of the ANC. Nonetheless, they are cognizant of their role in 
such a saga.  
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 The embrace of GEAR eased Pretoria toward consideration of deeper and 
more profound structural reforms. Chief among these was privatization, both of state 
owned assets and of service provision. The case of privatization demonstrates well 





























Privatization: Investor Services and Hot Water 
 
 In the late 1990’s, South Africa became a stage for the conflicts over 
privatization occurring in many corners of the world. In this thesis, I cannot 
comprehensively chronicle the South African experience with privatization. Instead, I 
will concentrate upon one specific case, that of the privatization of water services. 
Discord over municipal water service provision has impassioned and enraged South 
Africans, probably to a greater degree than privatization in any other sector. The case 
also offers much insight into the behavior of the institutions treated in this paper.  
 Specifically, it provides an example of ANC response to truly concerted 
pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions. The Washington sisters had, and have, 
little concrete ability to influence South African domestic policy, as mentioned above. 
The case of water services privatization is instructive because it is a situation in which 
the IFI’s actually applied pressure to the South African government, despite that they 
technically lack the capability to do so. The ANC responded by sidestepping the 
concerns of their labor allies in order to make reforms favored by international 
institutions. 
 This case may be that which most strongly demonstrates the ANC’s faithful 
adherence to what it determines to be western economic norms. The final four 
chapters in this thesis describe ANC policy that has negatively affected COSATU. In 
some cases, the jury is still out on whether or not the policies will benefit South 
Africa in the long run (except perhaps in the case of capital account openness, which 
has brought destabilizing volatility but little else). The case of privatization of water 
service provision is almost unique here in that such strategies have failed 
categorically throughout the world, and that the IFIs have shown themselves partially 
beholden to an extraordinarily organized water lobby. While controversy 
accompanies the Bretton Woods twins’ focus upon macroeconomic stabilization, 
currency account openness (in the 1990’s at least), and labor market flexibility, this is 
 
 81 
the only case in this paper in which the IFIs have clearly given South Africa faulty 
advice. Even COSATU has made much more cogent arguments against privatization 
of water services than the IFIs have made for it. This indicates that the ANC has been 
willing to support the views of the international institutions in the face not only of 
opposition within the Tripartite Alliance, but of a more widespread understanding that 
the drawbacks of IFI sponsored policy outweigh the benefits. The case of water 
privatization finds the ANC willing, and sometimes eager, to act on advice offered by 
the international actors that it respects, in the face of reason and at the expense of the 
labor movement.  
 
 A. Context 
 
 Within the ruling alliance, privatization has been as polarizing as any issue. 
Roger Ronnie, then General Secretary of the South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU), said in 1998 that “[SAMWU does] not hide from the fact that our 
opposition to privatization is ideological.”190 The union movement opposes nearly all 
privatization in principal and in practice. Given that unions tend to be more successful 
when interacting with the state as opposed to with private firms, this comes as no 
surprise. 
 Intense interest in privatization began in the late 1980’s. The NP set up the 
Government Privatization Commission in 1987; Reagan-Thatcher fever had 
percolated into South Africa through the wall of sanctions. Eskom (the electric power 
distributor), and Telkom (the state-owned telecommunications outfit) were to be the 
first to go. These were two of the largest state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 
country, and would again be targeted for privatization after the end of apartheid. At 
the height of the government’s interest in privatization, early in the current decade, 
the ANC planned the sale of dozens of SOEs, including Eskom, Telkom, South 
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African Airways, parts of the rail system, and even a stake in Denel, the arms 
manufacturer.191  
 The conditions leading to the introduction of GEAR led also to a renewed 
interest in privatization. Six months before GEAR’s word became law, the ANC and 
COSATU hammered out the National Framework Agreement on the Restructuring of 
State Assets (NFA). All parties and observers agreed that certain SOEs were ripe for 
sale. International experience showed that public ownership of airlines hampered 
efficiency, and the government owned a number of firms (such as software 
companies) and properties which could be privatized with little pain to labor. The 
NFA included the statement that “ownership does not determine operational 
efficiency”, along with various provisions providing for a safety net for workers 
negatively affected by state enterprise restructuring.192 The NFA also stipulated that 
councils, with representatives from labor and management, be set up to discuss 
transitional issues in workplaces affected by privatization. 
 The reversal of RDP commitments and the reorientation toward strict macro 
stabilization included proposals to privatize much more than the obviously ripe SOEs. 
Particularly frightening to labor were the rumors that began to circulate about public 
services privatization. Time and again, the ANC stated that the preferred provider of 
municipal services was the public sector. But none of these proclamations represented 
the force of law. Since 2000, the relevant piece of legislation has been the Municipal 
Systems Act, which COSATU had hoped would include a statement favoring public 
provision. It did not. Conversely, it did suggest that “service delivery should be as 
cost reflexive as possible.”193 This echoed the sentiments of the World Bank and the 
multinational water firms, as will be seen below.  
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 In 1999, the government created the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE), 
charged with both oversight of SOEs and the preparation of many of them for sale. 
This move coincided with the height of the ANC’s hawkishness about the public 
deficit, and pressure to sell state assets related to reasons both of efficiency and of 
revenue. In 2000, with the World Bank and the IMF strongly urging the government 
to push forward the timetable for privatization, the DPE released its “Accelerated 
Agenda Toward the Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises”. Alec Erwin, the 
former SACP intellectual and COSATU activist was then (and still is), the Minister of 
Public Enterprises, and this document strikes a very interesting balance between 
support for a developmental state and the need for privatization. The document quotes 
Harvard political economist Dani Rodrik and expresses support for the idea of a 
mixed economy, as exemplified by Korea. On the other hand, it employs in 
discussing privatization a technique used by the ANC since GEAR, and by liberal 
international institutions long before that. It portrays privatization as part of an 
ideologically neutral and natural progression, stating that “governments have realized 
that they do not have to provide all services.”194  
 The ANC did not respond satisfactorily to COSATU qualms about 
privatization, and the labor confederation eventually responded by calling a two day 
mass stay-away for the end of August, 2001. This represented the largest strike in 
South Africa since the end of apartheid, and between 3 and 5 million workers stayed 
home. NACTU, the 400,000 member strong union federation allied with the africanist 
Pan-African Congress, also participated. By that point, South African Airways had 
already been sold (only to be bought back later), and large shares of Telkom, Eskom, 
and Transnet (railroad) had been auctioned off. Various municipal services had been 
farmed out. COSATU feared the replication of situations such as that of Tygerberg 
municipality in the Western Cape. There, the city had contracted out its refuse 
service, only to have the contractor drop most of the former workers and hire casual 
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workers for lower pay and no benefits.195 While the stay-away temporarily disrupted 
economic activity, it did not immediately result in a rethink of privatization in 
Pretoria. 
 Failure upon failure of privatization experiments occurred before the ANC 
hierarchy began to question the strategy. Only recently has it become evident that the 
government has backed off from its ‘accelerated agenda’. The DPE has begun to 
speak more about infrastructure and less about asset sales, despite that Minister Erwin 
has said that there has been no shift in priorities.196 It is likely that the ANC fears 
upsetting its international boosters. This brings us to the case of municipal water 
privatization, where, for a long time, the ANC adhered to a set of ill-conceived 
notions espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions, and has paid dearly for it. 
 
 B. International Water Infiltrates the IFIs 
 
 Before exploring water services privatization in South Africa, the stage must 
be set by discussing the unique success that western water firms have had in lobbying 
the IFIs. The Washington institutions, notwithstanding their shortcomings, are 
typically considered bulwarks of professionalism, steeled against the machinations of 
influence peddlers. There are no known cases of direct corruption in the IFIs related 
to their interaction with water services firms. Nonetheless, they were, to some degree, 
seduced by firms looking to score contracts in the developing world during the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s. 
 A new space for water firms was carved out in the 1990’s, when economists 
began to insist that water should be treated and priced as a commodity like any 
other.197 The predominant view became that water had been too heavily subsidized in 
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the past, and that it should be priced to reflect cost. Water executives often remark 
something to the effect that ‘god may have given us water, but not the pipes’. David 
McDonald and Greg Ruiters, two South African political scientists, call this instead 
“the Malthusian catastrophism that informs mainstream water discourses.”198
 Movement toward full commoditization of water proceeded apace throughout 
the 1990’s. The giant multinational water firms, Suez (French), Vivendi (French), 
Bouyges-Saur (French), and Thames Water-RWE (Anglo-German) among others, 
had much to gain. In 1996, representatives from Canada and nine European nations 
formed the Global Water Partnership, which demanded that water be treated as an 
‘economic good’. In the same year, the World Water Council (WWC) brought 
together the World Bank, the EU, the UNDP, and private companies. One of the 
subjects discussed was how to improve private sector access to water services 
markets. In 1999, René Coulomb, former director of Suez, the world’s largest water 
company, was the Vice President of the WWC.  
 The IFIs have focused undue attention upon water privatization during the last 
ten years, and this cannot be divorced from their relationship with the private sector. 
The IMF imposed conditions related to privatization of water services on eight 
African countries during the 1990’s.199 Political economist Patrick Bond cites in his 
2004 book a study by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which 
found that of the 20 billion dollars disbursed by the World Bank to water projects 
between 1991 and 2003, over one third of the funding was tied to conditions related 
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There is truth in this:  most water is used either by industry or agriculture, and subsidies for 
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to privatization.200 The IFC funded projects worth tens of millions of dollars in Sao 
Paulo (Suez), Bolivia (Suez), and Thailand (Thames-RWE). It loaned between 300 
and 500 million dollars (depending on how certain funds are classified) to Suez to 
finance its concession in Buenos Aires.201 The Argentine project proved disastrous for 
Suez, as payment collection collapsed during the debacle of 2001/2002.202 
 Coziness between the water industry, western governments, and the IFIs 
increased throughout in the 1990’s. World Bank officials attended meetings held by 
the WWC, which was based in Marseilles and became largely a creature of the 
French water conglomerates. The 2003 World Water Forum in Kyoto attracted 
officials from the World Bank, the IMF, developed world finance ministries, private 
companies, and a number of people whose presence can only be explained by their 
connection to the ethereal world that exists between France and its former colonies.203 
Michel Camdessus, the former Managing Director of the IMF, chaired the 
conference. 
 The final report produced by the 2003 conference in Kyoto provides the best 
evidence of the IFIs baffling infatuation (at least until very recently) with 
multinational firm access to water markets. It proposed a ‘Devaluation Liquidity 
Backstopping Facility’, a fund that would compensate multinational firms in the event 
of severe currency devaluation in the country in which they were operating (as the 
firms collect revenue in local currency but carry considerable amounts of largely 
dollar denominated debt). The defense of the proposal stated that it would encourage 
foreign investment in water by dampening risk. That is undoubtedly true. But 
                                                 
200 Bond, Patrick. Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms. 
Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2004. p. 156 
201 Ibid. Barlow and Clarke. p. 162 
202 In late 2001, Argentina’s currency board system, based upon a 1 to 1 peg of the dollar to 
the Argentine peso, collapsed. This forced Argentina to declare the largest sovereign default 
(in nominal dollar terms) in history as the value of the peso plummeted, bottoming out at 25% 
of the value of the dollar. Suez was then collecting one quarter of what it had collected in 
early 2001 (if consumers paid at all).  
203 Among these was Alassane Outtara, whose exclusion from the recent presidential race in 
Cote d’Ivoire nearly resulted in civil war. Officially, he represented a sham institution 
headquartered in Gabon, the French client-state par excellence. 
 
 87 
consumers in developing countries would shoulder the cost. The facility proposes that 
the funds it disburses be repaid over the long-term by the countries hit by the 
currency crises, and not by firms.204 These funds would be raised through a uniform 
water surcharge, essentially a regressive tax. This imposes depreciation related costs 
entirely upon the countries affected. World Water Forum participants, including 
chairman Camdessus, must have been deluded to believe that any country would 
accept such a plan. Most countries look suspiciously upon granting water contracts to 
private firms; why would they then take a great risk in doing so? 
 The position of the IFIs has been, until the last couple of years, conspicuously 
biased toward the concerns of ‘big-water’. In 2001, the World Bank published a 
working paper titled Water Challenge and Institutional Response. In typical fashion, 
it frames water commoditization as an organic and inevitable process: 
 
 The notion of water provision as a public good and welfare activity has given 
 place to the concept of water as an economic good and input in economic 
 activity.205 
 
A similar perspective is evident in the World Bank’s 2004 World Development 
Report. The IFIs are still somewhat pragmatic, proposing subsidies to the poorest 
citizens of developing countries. Generally, however, they recommended full cost 
recovery. This has greatly affected the ANC’s outlook and nearly neutralized 
COSATU’s influence over water policy. Even when IFI policy should be perceived as 
erroneous and inapplicable to South Africa, the ANC has strained itself to please the 
international bodies. 
 
 C. Water Privatization in South Africa: Protest and No Profit 
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 The most famous of the South African water privatization projects has been 
that of Nelspruit, Mpumalanga province. In it are seen many of the problems that 
have beset nearly all water privatizations in the country. In 1996, the ANC began to 
quietly consider piloting a water concession; the timing was not coincidental in light 
of the burgeoning interest in water at the IFIs. Under apartheid, the Nelspruit 
municipality contained approximately 25,000 residents, nearly all white. In 1994 the 
municipality inherited the abutting ‘homeland’, KaNgane, and the population within 
the city limits instantly rose to 230,000. Residents per length of water pipe also rose 
by a factor of six, and the tax base rose only 38%, despite that the population had 
grown tenfold.206 Poverty, unemployment, and HIV infection rates in Mpumalanga 
province are all higher than national averages.207 In 1998, a majority private-owned 
consortium began to operate the town’s water system. 
 The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Municipal 
Infrastructure Investment Unit, a group founded with money from USAID, prepared 
the documents used as tender for the private contract. Provincial officials in 
Mpumalanga were skeptical about the potential for water privatization; purportedly, 
ANC national officials went over the heads of provincial officials to apply pressure 
directly to the municipality. ANC national officers, attuned (and often hostage to) 
international opinion, would brook no interference from the provinces, despite the 
strongly federal nature of service provision in South Africa.208 The concessionaire is 
owned jointly by Biwater (British), Nuon (Dutch), and domestic investors, and 
operated by Biwater. However, the DBSA initially provided a majority of the 
funding, effectively subsidizing Biwater’s contract. It hoped to ease the firm into 
solvency.  
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 Incentives to private firms have been offered often during the last ten years, 
typically by the DBSA. Capitalized by the South African government, the 
Development Bank maintains very close relations with both the ANC and the Bretton 
Woods Institutions.209 Research from the Development Bank tends to echo research 
coming from the IFIs in both choice of topic and in the framing of normative 
judgments as objective ones.210 
 The 30-year Nelspruit concession has resulted in a certain number of 
successful outcomes. The concessionaire has laid 100km of new water mains (mostly 
with public money), created over 1000 temporary jobs, and instituted some 
‘innovative methods’ when confronted with non-payment (such as leaving arrears off 
of bills so that consumers do not feel overwhelmed).211  
 Notwithstanding the benefits of privatization in Nelspruit, the negatives have 
outweighed the positives. These drawbacks are not primarily the fault in this case of 
the private concessionaire, but of the ANC, which did not recognize the 
incompatibility of privatization with Nelspruit’s profile. Furthermore, the ruling party 
lacked, and lacks, the infrastructure necessary to regulate a private monopoly 
contract. In 1999, the Nelspruit city council set up the Compliance Monitoring Unit 
and charged it with ensuring the good-faith implementation of the contract by 
Biwater. It was composed of municipal officials, DBSA officials, and representatives 
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of the concessionaire. After a short time, its meetings began to decrease in frequency. 
Eventually, there was a period of approximately one year when a lone, overworked 
official monitored the contract all by himself, followed by six months when the 
contract was not monitored at all.212 Given the scope for abuse of monopoly private 
concession contracts, this constitutes a failure of grave implications for the ANC. It is 
not at all clear that the governing council of a struggling municipality such as 
Nelspruit (which, after the elections of 2000, was reborn as the Mbombela 
municipality, with a population of nearly 600,000)213 has the capacity to effectively 
monitor a large scale privatization contract. 
 Nor is for-profit water provision appropriate in an extremely poor district such 
as Mbombela. Responding to consternation among citizen’s groups, unions, and 
residents throughout the country, the government implemented a ‘free water policy’ 
in June of 2001. Since then, every household has been entitled to 6 kiloliters of free 
water per month. Assuming an average household size of 8 (and this is the official 
estimate in South Africa, where extended families often live together), each person 
receives approximately 25 l per day. The World Health Organization estimates this to 
be the bare minimum required to sustain life, but recommends 100 l per person per 
day if ‘full hygiene’ is to be maintained. In speeches and campaign literature, the 
ANC has championed free water as one of its pioneering pro-poor measures. 
 How free is ‘free water’? In Mbombela, the municipal council, which still 
controls water tariffs under the concession, has raised rates in higher consumption 
brackets in order to subsidize the free water. This cross-subsidization commences at 
20 kl per month, a common level of consumption in even the poorest areas of the 
municipality, where most residents earn under R1000 per month. If bills for total 
water usage are paid, they often amount to 10% of the monthly income of poor 
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residents.214 Often, then, water is not paid for. In Matsulu, the poorest sub-district of 
Mbombela, the Biwater concessionaire reported in 2003 88% of all water as 
‘unaccounted for’ (most of it stolen by residents through illegal connections).215  
 These loses have compromised Biwater’s revenue collection, and neither it 
nor the ANC-run council have shown themselves capable of plugging the holes in the 
water network opened by desperate residents. Biwater has not yet profited from the 
concession, even though public bodies have provided most of the funding for the 
concessionaire and have shouldered most of the risk. These types of results have 
reproduced themselves across the South African water privatization experience. In the 
KwaZulu-Natal town of Dolphin Coast, the town council divested in 1999, to a great 
extent, the responsibility for water provision to a consortium owned by Saur, a 
subsidiary of the French giant Bouyges. Built into the contract was a provision that 
water prices would not be raised for five years. Nonetheless, Saur managed to raise 
prices two years later, after having the contract rewritten in its favor.216 It did this by 
essentially holding the town hostage. After Dolphin Coast divested, it could not easily 
resume public provision. It caved to the firm’s demands, fearing the chaos that might 
ensue after a sudden restoration of public control for which there was no longer 
bureaucratic infrastructure. The Nonkobe municipality on the Eastern Cape recently 
won a court battle against its private provider, claiming that the firm had extorted the 
city for the same reasons that it was possible for Saur to rewrite its contract in 
Dolphin Coast. Water privatization has proven itself both a politically bankrupt and 
financially bankrupting strategy. 
 The Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF) might be expected to 
complement municipal efforts to provide a minimum level of water services in every 
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district, but this has been hampered by the ANC’s subscription to the view that water 
should be treated like any other commodity. In 2003, an Economist survey on water 
beseeched governments to consider water as an economic good, complaining that 
water is “colossally underpriced.”217 As seen above, this perception has been strongly 
promoted by the World Bank, whose word is often currency to the ANC leadership. 
 DWAF does provide some municipal subsidies, and has funded some 
innovative projects that extend service provision within a public framework. In Odi, a 
former part of the Bophuthatswana ‘homeland’, the parastatal Rand Water board 
initiated a process that would have eventually led to privatization unless reversed. 
After a SAMWU strike, the water board reconsidered, and developed a provision 
strategy that relied upon locally elected steering committees to aid in tariff collection 
and act as a bridge between the service provider and local communities. Between 
April 1998, when this plan went into effect, and September 1999, monthly tariff 
collections rose from R500k to R2 million.218 In the first year of the Odi project, 
DWAF provided R42 million in subsidies, addressing some of Odi’s immense 
infrastructure backlog. However, in 2000, the agency declared that it could no longer 
provide such large subsidies; infrastructure began again to deteriorate and payment 
rates subsequently dropped.219  
 Myriad demands strain the South African fiscus, and one might ask whether 
water provision is the best use of revenue, even in terms of targeted poverty 
reduction. COSATU has made one of the most convincing arguments for high levels 
of water subsidization. At a mid-2001 meeting of NEDLAC, COSATU tabled a paper 
arguing that cost-reflexive water pricing is “hostile to micro-enterprise in rural 
areas.”220 Forcing deprived citizens to pay the full cost of water provision relegates 
many of them to partial or complete reliance on well water, river water, or illegal 
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water main connections. All of these are very costly in terms of time and effort, 
requiring energy and ingenuity that could otherwise be applied to productive 
enterprise.  
 COSATU’s paper also points out that water privatization constitutes a market 
failure. Private companies will chronically underinvest in water services, as they 
capture little of the long term benefit of infrastructure provision.221 In essence, water 
services is a public good of such magnitude that private provision is a fundamentally 
flawed approach. The ramifications for health systems, communities, and the 
potential for small businesses to flourish in poor areas far outweigh the efficiency 
gains from privatization. Neither does water lend itself well to commoditization in 
general. It is difficult to transport, requires large and heavily targeted investment, and 
is therefore a case of natural monopoly, of which public ones are often less damaging 
than private.222 The ANC largely ignored these considerations during the late 1990’s 
and early 2000’s, partially due to the pro-cost recovery orientation of the IFIs. Once 
again, the ANC carefully avoids admitting that it simply follows prescriptions 
emanating from Washington. Yet the timing of its interest in privatization and the 
methods employed are unlikely to be coincidentally aligned with those of the 
international institutions.  
  
 D. The ANC Rerouted 
  
 After SAMWU threatened to call a series of strikes, the Nelspruit 
concessionaire agreed to zero retrenchment and maintenance of wages at previous 
levels. Biwater did much to assuage SAMWU; it even hired a SAMWU 
representative to its permanent staff. Biwater’s workers have never gone on strike. 
Typical of the water privatization experience has been that unions, usually COSATU 
affiliates, have threatened mass action in order to forestall privatization, backing 
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down at the moment of the ANC’s agreement to negotiate. In nearly all cases, the 
unions have failed to prevent privatization, although they have sometimes ensured the 
maintenance of employment levels. SAMWU has exhibited a great acumen in 
mounting aggressive anti-privatization media campaigns. The union stoked media 
interest by accusing the Nelspruit concessionaire of malfeasance during 
implementation of the contract; the strength of the initial media coverage far eclipsed 
that when SAMWU retracted the allegations.223 However, COSATU, the union 
structure with the best access to Pretoria and the media, has been unable or unwilling 
to spare much political capital in contesting individual privatization programs in the 
post-GEAR era. Member unions find themselves largely alone, unable to count on 
greater than token support from the confederation. 
 Nonetheless, COSATU protests privatization for two reasons. In the first 
instance, the union movement fears the job cuts that often accompany privatization, 
as formerly ‘swollen’ payrolls are slashed. But even more, the fight over privatization 
has engaged COSATU in social conflict, and renewed its commitment to the concept 
of ‘social movement unionism’.  
 The battle that has put the ANC and COSATU at rhetorical loggerheads over 
water privatization is a good example of this aspect of union action. SAMWU has 
successfully defended wages, benefits, and jobs to a large degree in the water sector. 
It and its parent organization, COSATU, are nonetheless quick to point out the 
incongruity of water privatization in the South African context. The politics of water 
commoditization are atypical in South Africa. At the end of apartheid, a ‘culture of 
non-payment’ pervaded the townships and homelands. Blacks ceased, in protest, to 
pay the white regime for essential services. Apartheid governments rarely turned off 
the taps, fearing violent retaliation. Poor, black South Africans therefore look 
suspiciously on service providers that do not respond personally to members of 
individual communities, and multinationals naturally fit this profile.  
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 Issues of efficiency are thus often trumped by political concerns. Entrusting 
the private sector with provision of services is potentially explosive and evokes 
painful memories. COSATU appears to understand this, while the ANC believed it 
could traverse this minefield with careful planning. Recently, however, the ruling 
party has backtracked. There are no new water privatization projects on the table. 
Those previously signed have turned out to be unprofitable and politically 
inconvenient for both firms and the ANC. In 1999, the ANC unveiled ‘Igoli 2002’, an 
overarching plan for the reformation of Johannesburg’s city services. It followed 
upon a series of studies undertaken by the World Bank on the potential for services 
reform, proposing privatization or partial privatization of a significant piece of the 
public sector’s charge. One of the first measures of ‘Igoli 2002’ to be experimentally 
implemented was the installation of pre-paid water meters, which had residents pay 
for a certain amount of water at the beginning of the month, with the ability to buy 
more ‘water credits’ as necessary. This caused great consternation among 
communities, unions, and civil society groups, as residents often ran out of credits 
with many days left in the month and struggled to restore service. The political 
windfall of the pre-paid water meters was disastrous for the ANC. In 2003, SAMWU 
explained its opposition to pre-paid meters thus: 
 
 [With pre-paid meters], poverty is turned into individual problems with 
 individual solutions, rather than collective problems requiring social 
 solutions.224 
 
This aptly summarizes the central tenet of the union opposition to water privatization; 
the externalities created by water services provision demand public intervention. 
 The ANC has backed down somewhat from its privatization agenda under 
great domestic pressure. So too has interest in water privatization in the IFIs subsided. 
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As with many of the programs undertaken by the government in order to improve its 
international standing, the international response to the ANC’s policy swings has 
been tepid in both directions. Investors and institutions have made minimal noise over 
South Africa’s stealthy retreat from privatization. Once again, international actors 
have been quick to make policy recommendations but have neither rewarded South 
Africa for its reforms (nor punished it for reneging). 
 This leads us to the final chapter of this thesis. Under fire over GEAR and 
privatization, the ANC may now be turning toward a battle on labor’s sacred soil. 
Signs have surfaced that the government is contemplating a wide-ranging labor 
market reform package. This would shake the foundations of the Tripartite Alliance. 
Again, pressure to conform to international ‘consensus’ has played a significant role 



















Chapter VIII  
Perseverance: Labor Market Reform  
 
 Among developing countries, South Africa’s labor laws are among the most 
favorable to workers in the world. While some ‘middle-income’ countries have seen 
labor legislation rolled back during the past 15 years, the ANC has not yet 
backtracked on its legal commitments to organized labor.225 Former unionist Tito 
Mboweni rode the ANC-COSATU wave into office as chief of the Department of 
Labour in 1994. He went on to oversee the reconstitution of the South African labor 
market on lines ostensibly non-racial and non-discriminatory. But the murmurs from 
within government of a future overhaul of labor laws have grown into a chorus of 
confident voices, and COSATU may yet see the end of the so-called South African 
‘worker’s paradise’. 
 In the domain of its greatest preoccupation, COSATU has seen its greatest 
victories. In the public sector, a COSATU-inspired wage restructuring plan cut the 
remuneration ratio of the highest paid civil servant class to the lowest paid from 64:1 
to 15:1 between 1989 and 1998.226 It also set a public sector minimum wage of 
R1000/month, an improvement over the apartheid era compensation that constituted 
virtual wage slavery.227 At the same time, 96% of South African public sector 
employees were unionized, compared to 80% in the UK and 67% in Japan.228 Events 
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proceeded likewise in the private sector; the wage gap between blacks and whites 
narrowed by nearly 10% between 1990 and 2000, even in the absence of the strictly 
defined adjustments that occurred in the public sector.229 Certainly, there is much 
more work to be done. Nonetheless, the combination of union entrenchment on the 
shop floor and the new legal dispensation produced this bargain, and african labor 
declared its position morally, politically, and practically unassailable. 
 But even as COSATU celebrated its formidable victory, it began to encounter 
resistance. By the late 1990’s, the questions being asked by the opponents of the new 
labor regime were impossible to wish away. Why did the economy fail to absorb 
nearly all entrants into the job market? Why did business show such a strong bias 
toward capital intensive production? Rigidities in the labor market were often faulted 
for these serious shortcomings. The preeminent powers within the ANC, influenced 
by business and by the analysis of the World Bank and the IMF, now believe it 
imperative that the labor market be more flexible and more hospitable to small 
business. 
 COSATU’s position on labor law has been clear and unwavering during the 
post-apartheid period; the union confederation intends to defend to the last inch its 
prerogatives. It strikes a reactionary pose when accused by scholars and policy 
makers of perpetuation of an ‘insider-outsider’ paradigm in the labor market.  
 The World Bank and the IMF argue that the labor markets must be liberalized 
in order to unleash the dynamism that most observers believe the South African 
economy to be capable of. By the late 1990’s, the IFIs had begun to raise these 
concerns vociferously. In an interview with the author, Trevor Alleyne of the IMF 
stated that, outside of its core competencies in monetary and fiscal policy, the Fund’s 
chief structural concern regarding South Africa was that of labor market rigidities.230 
This comes despite research from within the IFIs themselves questioning whether 
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such rigidity really deserves the attention that it receives. Other research, however, 
supports the dominant position in Washington; untangling the causes of 
unemployment and labor market inefficiency is an empirically delicate business, 
fraught with disagreement over quantitative technique and qualitative assumptions. 
 The ANC appears torn. It must decide whether to pursue labor market reform 
and risk a nasty confrontation with allies, or to strike out in a different, less internally 
controversial path. Recent maneuvers signal that it may be preparing to do both 
simultaneously. While discussion has heated up over labor markets, the state has 
begun to publicize its preparation to unveil a comprehensive industrial policy, a first 
for democratic South Africa. Does this represent a means by which to distract labor 
from the blow dealt by labor market reform? Or, is it the work of an ANC faction in 
favor of more interventionist state (led, perhaps, by Alec Erwin)? It is more likely a 
combination of these two factors. The moment has not yet arrived, and the ANC’s 
motives remain unclear. However, it begs us to examine the Motor Vehicle Industry 
Development Programme, upon which any future strategy would be based. 
 If the ANC does decide to reverse the progressive labor reforms of the 1990’s, 
it must be seen as a normative decision. Neither privatization, fiscal austerity, 
retirement of foreign debt, nor capital account liberalization has jump-started private 
sector growth.  The drive to loosen the labor market might be the ANC’s final push to 
promote growth using techniques sanctioned by the IFIs and the international 
community that embodies the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. 
 Despite being rooted in conflicting ideologies, the enthusiasm for the MIDP 
and labor law reform in the ANC can be partially explained by one of the unifying 
themes of this thesis. The ANC has endeavored to improve dramatically the 
international image of South African economic policy and South African business (as 
well as perhaps to strengthen the image of its own leaders). This pattern would 





A. The South African Labor Market 
 
 The apartheid workplace reflected the overarching national political project. 
Nevertheless, it managed to be particularly brutal, degrading, and inefficient. In 
factories, it was not uncommon for a black worker to be humiliatingly singled out to 
wash a white man’s car in the parking lot.231 At the time of liberation, labor and the 
ANC promised equality, renewal, increased efficiency, and job security. By the late 
1990’s the labor movement had armed itself with a slew of parliamentary laws. These 
included the National Economic Development and Labor Council Act (NEDLAC) of 
1994, which provided for dispute arbitration by independent judges, the Labor 
Relations Act of 1995, which redistributed bargaining power from business to labor, 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, which formalized the new 
workplace code, and the Employment Equity Act of 1998, which strengthened legal 
recourse for employees experiencing racism in the workplace.  
  The country also saw fundamental change beyond the legislative sphere. 
Although South Africa has not specified a minimum wage, unions and business 
representatives have agreed through NEDLAC to minimum wages in many 
industries. In a number of sectors, wages are determined by industrial council 
agreements, legal accords signed by industry associations and unions. Industrial 
council agreements and other less rigid agreements cover approximately 25% of the 
formal labor force, according to COSATU.232 Some among these are covered 
explicitly and some by extension, as many agreements extend automatically to non-
union workers. There are 81 industrial councils operating in South Africa, and 
approximately 90% of the agreements spawned by them cover at least some non-
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union workers.233 These agreements are often criticized for their restrictive nature and 
associated compliance costs.  
 Under the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the 
Department of Labour has also made a number of ‘sectoral determinations’ of wages 
and benefits, primarily in the service sector. These regulations are subject to the same 
critiques as the industrial council agreements. Indeed, a look at the sectoral wage 
schedule for the security services industry (private security guards) breeds some 
sympathy for detractors; the Department of Labor breaks down security guards into 
five categories and assigns different pay scales to each category of guard. It is 
manifestly difficult for the layperson to identify what distinguishes certain categories 
from others.234 
 These regulations may, however, receive undue attention. The mining sector 
is not covered by an industrial council agreement. Yet, in its hardest hit sector, gold, 
employment fell from nearly 400,000 workers to fewer than 220,000 between 1994 
and 2000.235 This was partially related to developments over which the government 
had little control, including the low price of gold on world markets during the period 
and the exhaustion of South African mines. Yet these problems were at least partially 
offset by a weak rand (see chapter 5). A less often treated possibility is that, in the 
face of rising labor costs, the demands of the Black Economic Empowerment statutes, 
and falling import duties, mine operators have replaced labor with imported capital 
equipment. The ANC’s inadequate attention to these sorts of effects will be further 
explored in the case of the motor vehicle industry. 
 The South African labor market has exhibited some trends that appear 
contradictory: falling levels of employment, substitution of capital for labor, rising 
                                                 
233 Butcher, Kristen, and Cecelia Rouse. “Wage Effects of Unions and Industrial Councils in 
South Africa” (Washington DC: World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2520. January, 
2001) 
234 South Africa Department of Labour Basic Conditions of Employment Act- Sectoral 
Determination 6: Private Security Sector 2001 
235 Crankshaw, Paul. “Mining and Minerals” in Geography and Economy in South Africa and 
its Neighbors Anthony Lemon and Christian Rogerson, eds. Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 
2002. p. 64 
 
 102 
wages, and rising labor productivity. The final two can be largely explained by the 
first two, however. Much of the decline in employment represents retrenchment of 
unskilled laborers.236 Between 1990 and 1998, South Africa shed 700,000 low skill 
jobs while adding 80,000 higher skill jobs.237 Unions are well entrenched in many 
sectors, bolstered by the labor legislation of the late 1990’s which they frequently 
brandish to fight retrenchments, wage freezes, and casualization. These things 
necessarily inhibit the speed of adjustment in the labor market, and the ANC likely 
now understands them to be the banana in the tailpipe of the South African economy. 
 
 B. The Debate 
 
 The summer of 2005 saw the resurrection of a measure once considered 
unthinkable in post-apartheid South Africa. In June, Deputy Finance Minister Jabu 
Moleketi suggested to the ANC National General Council the institution of a ‘dual’ 
labor market.238 New hires would be treated very differently from older ones, to 
which the current regulations would continue to apply. Recall that the South Africa 
Foundation, the post-apartheid reincarnation of the Chamber of Commerce, proposed 
similar measures in 1996, to uniformly cool response in Pretoria. Even when GEAR 
was unfurled, the ANC did not dare to take a potentially explosive stance against the 
labor regime so cherished by its union allies. Today, the ANC has reversed field, to 
applause among businessmen at home and observers abroad and to the chagrin of 
COSATU. 
  
  1. COSATU’s Stance 
 
 At first glace, analysis of COSATU’s position during this saga does not 
require a great assay. The union confederation is thoroughly opposed to any proposal 
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that reeks of interest in ‘labor market flexibility’. COSATU is the primary beneficiary 
of the regulations as they stand, and has much to lose if they are reformed along the 
lines envisioned by Trevor Manuel and the IMF, among others.  
 When challenged on the point of labor market structure, COSATU reacts 
swiftly and testily. The IMF’s latest Article IV consultation for South Africa, 
published in September 2005, dedicated a section of the “Selected Issues” paper to 
the conclusion that the structure of the South African labor market impeded growth 
and contributed greatly to unemployment. Union spokesman Paul Notyhawa, likely at 
the behest of the indefatigable COSATU Chief Economist Neva Makgleta, responded 
by referencing a different document, one published by the South Africa Small 
Business Partnership (a pro-business group) in June of 2005. That paper found that, in 
surveys, small businesses cited weak demand and lack of supply-side confidence 
ahead of labor legislation on a list of effects dampening growth. The study also found 
that, out of 794 small business owners surveyed, only 10% felt that high labor costs 
were a key constraint to employment growth.239  
 Since the World Bank published its 2004 Cost of Doing Business report, 
COSATU has been increasingly criticized for its cantankerous attitude. The Bank 
developed an index for a number of measures of labor market rigidity. South Africa 
scored particularly high (poorly) in a number of categories, especially in ‘difficulty of 
hiring and firing’, where it scored above sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the worst 
region. South Africa’s overall ‘rigidity of employment’ score was 52. This compared 
unfavorably with East Asia and the Pacific (24), the Middle East and North Africa 
(38), and even Europe (41), notorious for its labyrinthine labor regulations.240 To 
boot, a recent Economist Intelligence Unit survey ranked South Africa’s labor market 
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as the least flexible of 60 countries studied.241 COSATU’s response to these analyses 
has been categorical, asserting that the studies are flawed. 
 While much is at stake in this debate for COSATU members, it is conceivable 
that COSATU’s response has been shortsighted. The union movement has been 
shrinking since liberation, following the downward trend in formal employment and 
‘smokestack’ employment in particular. An uptick in employment rates, as well as a 
greater ability to recruit service employees (many of whom are casual workers under 
the current system) could aid in reversing the shrinking of the membership role. New 
regulations could potentially aid the union movement in both of these areas. 
COSATU must proceed cautiously, as its current stance gives some credence 
accusations that it perpetuates a system ‘by, of, and for insiders’. 
 
  2. The IMF and the World Bank: Unsteady Consensus 
 
 The Bretton Woods institutions are not ideologically monolithic. This is easily 
evidenced by the row caused by Joseph Stiglitz during his tenure as the World Bank’s 
Chief Economist, when he championed debt reduction for certain countries and a host 
of micro measures that had not previously been foci of the institutions. Many Bank 
and Fund analysts have become apologetic about some of the harsher measures 
favored during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  
 The debate over the explanatory power of South African labor market 
structure also brings to light discord within the IFIs. For the time being, the faction 
heavily weighting labor law as a factor in unemployment and sclerotic growth 
appears to be ascendant. A volume recently released by the IMF chronicling the first 
ten years of post-apartheid South Africa estimates that between three-quarters and 
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one percent of GDP is lost annually to labor market related bureaucracy.242 The 
document urges concerted reform. 
   The study that informs much of the analysis of South African labor law 
within the IFIs dates from 1998, when T. Paul Schultz, a professor of economics at 
Yale, and Germano Mwabu of the University of Nairobi coauthored a study that 
appeared in the Journal of Industrial and Labor Relations. They found that the 
benefits that accrued to african union members were causing gross inequity and 
inefficiency in the labor market. In the bottom decile of the african income 
distribution, union membership was associated with higher wages by nearly 150%. At 
the top of the wage distribution, the discrepancy narrowed to about 20%, still a 
significant figure.243 On average, union membership predicted a 60% difference in 
wages over non-union members in the same employment, and the gap widened 
further when union members were strictly compared with non-union workers not 
covered by an industrial bargaining agreement. This report relied on survey data from 
1993, before the enactment of the labor regime so favorable to unions. Proponents of 
the results of this study assert that the wage discrepancies described above cannot 
generally have narrowed very much, given the post-1994 legal climate. World Bank 
and IMF analyses frequency cite this, along with another World Bank study that came 
to similar conclusions, by Bruno Boccara and Peter Moll. 
 This appears somewhat incongruous when confronted with a 2001 World 
Bank paper that contests Schultz and Mwabu’s findings. Kristen Butcher and Cecilia 
Rouse found that, on average, african union members earned 20% more than non-
union africans in the same jobs, an estimate only one third as large as Schultz and 
Mwabu’s. Butcher and Rouse explain the discrepancy thus: Schultz and Mwabu did 
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not control for workers’ industry and occupation when making their estimates.244 
Essentially, Rouse and Butcher accuse Schultz and Mwabu of analytical error. 
Tucked away at the back of Schultz and Mwabu’s paper is a table in which 
regressions control for workers’ occupation; it indicates that the union/non-union 
wage spreads are very similar to those calculated by Butcher and Rouse.  
 Butcher and Rouse’s findings had to potential to reframe the acrimonious 
debate on labor reform, if they had not been largely ignored. Their paper concludes 
that: 
 
 To increase employment, policies in South Africa should focus on increasing 
 competition among employers within sectors, rather than increasing 
 competition among workers by trying to reduce union power.245 
 
Nobody, other than COSATU, claims that South African labor law does not 
contribute, at least slightly, to the stratospheric unemployment rate. But the claim that 
labor market structure is responsible for a great tranche of a rate estimated at above 
40% is polarizing, and probably reflects ideological bias. 
 The ANC, for one, certainly believes that other effects are at work. The ANC 
may have endeavored to ‘thin’ the presence of domestic conglomerates in South 
Africa by loosening capital controls, as mentioned above. The ruling party 
comprehends to some degree the damage caused both by the oligopolistic nature of 
South African business and the apartheid legacy of partiality toward capital-intensive 
production. In contrast, the World Bank and the IMF have continued to recommend 
labor reform, and only sporadically talk of reforming the business sector. In an 
interview, Dr. Alleyne of the IMF could not recollect any discussion within the Fund 
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of business sector dynamics during his time working on South Africa. A World Bank 
Africa Region paper, published in 2001, attributes many problems to labor law and 
agreements, but also avers that “one economic legacy of apartheid is a structure of 
production that is fundamentally inconsistent with the country’s factor endowments, 
most notably in the phenomenon of high capital intensity in the presence of abundant 
labor.”246 The World Bank’s private investment arm, the International Finance 
Corporation, complains that it has trouble identifying small and medium sized South 
African firms in which to invest.247 
 From the standpoint of the IFIs, the ailments and elixirs remain the same; 
labor law must change if South Africa is to escape stagnation. The 2000 IMF Article 
IV consultation document states that in times of downturn, South African employers 
bear the brunt of adjustment, due to the rigidity of labor law.248 This specific 
comment prompted a flurry of COSATU vitriol. COSATU asked how this conclusion 
stood up to the fact that many of South Africa’s largest companies shed thousands of 
workers during the 1990’s, and then hired (or rehired) casual workers to fill their 
positions. In 2005, the counsel remained the same; the IMF largely blamed labor law 
for the counter-intuitively capital heavy nature of production.249 This again caused 
COSATU leaders to become irate and attack the IMF for ignoring apartheid history 
and making the same policy recommendations to all countries in similar statistical 
categories.250 The IMF fired back. Saul Lizondo, an African Department advisor, 
wrote in a Business Day (Johannesburg) editorial that COSATU had grossly and 
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“unfaithfully” misrepresented the IMF’s perspective.251 There is little common 
ground in this conflict between labor and the IFIs. It falls to the ANC to decide 
whether to favor its internal constituency or its international boosters. 
 
  3. The ANC: Marching on in Liberal Lockstep? 
 
 In a 2003 article, two British academics compared Thabo Mbeki’s South 
Africa to Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Brazil and Carlos Menem’s Argentina, in that 
the governments of each have both protected relatively small union constituencies 
while widely pursuing liberalization.252 The ANC has indeed followed this path up 
until now. But it is unclear whether they will resist the international siren call any 
longer. Throughout the 1990’s, groups of various stripes called for relaxation of the 
labor regime, but none of their ideas gained much traction in Preotria. In 1998, even 
Cyril Ramaphosa, former NUM secretary and labor movement deity, was already 
cautioning that “the recent procession of labor enactments could be burdensome and 
so affect job creation.”253 One must note, however, that Ramaphosa had by that point 
defected from the labor movement to become the Chief Executive of South African 
Breweries. 
 The atmosphere within the ANC has changed recently, although only at the 
top of the party and not necessarily in the bureaucracy or in the legislature. This 
disjuncture between different levels of the party speaks to the tendency of the ANC 
elite to internalize international policy consensus, and then inject it into a 
domestically focused bureaucracy. The summer of 2005 marked a turning point; top 
ANC officials stated that the party would perform research related to and probably 
soon introduce a labor reform package. Deputy Finance Minister Moleketi let the 
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proverbial cat out of the bag in June, when he implored the ANC to closely examine 
the “insider-outsider model of the South African economy.”254 During the fall of 
2005, Trevor Manuel often cited the IMF’s 2005 Article IV Selected Issues section on 
labor market reform as an indication that the time had come to embark on a reform 
program. Manuel’s rhetoric has also begun to feature such formerly taboo terms as 
‘labor aristocracy’.255 The Finance minister has commissioned a joint Department of 
Labour-World Bank research effort to quantitatively determine the cost of the labor 
market regulation as it exists, ostensibly in preparation to take the next step. 
 By contrast, documentation coming out of other ANC departments has 
exhibited less enthusiasm for reform. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
released, in 2005, a report written by mid-level bureaucrats that balked at rewriting 
the labor laws. It advocated that South Africa avoid the harshness of the ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ labor market in favor of a hybrid of the ‘Germanic’ and ‘East Asian’ labor 
regimes.256 This method of classification vastly oversimplifies the labor regimes of 
European and Asian countries.257 Nonetheless, South Africa currently represents an 
amalgamation of so-called Anglo-Saxon and Germanic practices. Trevor Manuel 
envisages a system closer to the Anglo-Saxon model, while DTI proposes an 
opposing course. We will see what emerges. But if recent history is any guide, the top 
officials at the Department of Finance will override the wishes of DTI. 
 What would be the dimensions of a new labor market dispensation? The 
outlines are becoming clearer: elimination of agreements that extend benefits to non-
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union workers or union members at non-participatory companies, curtailment of wage 
growth in both the public and the private sectors, simplification of the hiring and 
firing processes, the end of minimum wages, and a dual labor market (as described 
above). 
 Would labor reform spur growth and tackle unemployment? It is difficult to 
say. Generally, the World Bank estimates that a drop of 10 points in its labor market 
inflexibility meter results in a decrease in unemployment rates of between 0.5 and 
1%.258 This certainly does not predict that South Africa would make great inroads 
into unemployment through labor reform (although the less technical comments in the 
IMF’s Article IV document imply that they would). Reform must be part of a wider 
program. But will it be? Here we should examine the Motor Vehicle Industry 
Development Programme (MIDP) as a case of industrial strategy that does not 
encourage employment growth, and may even hamper it. The reasons for the ANC’s 
devotion to this program are manifold, and they square quite well with the argument 
of this paper. 
 
 C. The MIDP: An Engine for Growth? 
 
 In South Africa, the MIDP receives great acclaim. The ANC, the media, and 
businesses refer to it as a success. Industrial strategy is generally anathema to the 
IFIs. They have disapproved of the MIDP, although only lightly. COSATU’s position 
has wavered; the organization is at once in favor of subsidization and suspicious that 
money is being disbursed to capital-intensive sectors. Regarding its concern, the 
union movement may very well be correct. The ANC showcases the MIDP as a 
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model program, despite the misgivings of many groups. Purportedly, the ANC, in an 
effort led by Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, plans to unfurl a more 
expansive industrial strategy based on the MIDP.259  
 The MIDP visibly contradicts the liberal progression of the ANC’s rule. It 
cannot be seen purely as a means of pandering to labor, as COSATU’s response to the 
program has been lukewarm. In a wider context, however, the ANC sees it a pro-
labor measure, as it expects the MIDP and other industrial programs, like the Spatial 
Development Initiatives (SDI), to be engines of job growth. In motor vehicles, this 
job growth will supposedly occur while exports grow, establishing South Africa as a 
major player in an industry the success of which is traditionally conflated with high 
levels of development (although this idea has largely been refuted). Yet there is 
mounting evidence that the program negatively affects overall employment. It 
represents highly capital-intensive production, with most of the machinery used 
imported from abroad.260 The IFIs have paid little attention to the program; it is not 
clear why.261 Therefore, fear of disapproval in Washington need not be a driver of 
policy. The ANC has a ‘free hand’. 
 The government launched the MIDP in 1995, aiming to reorient toward export 
production an industry that had been highly protected under apartheid. Local Content 
Schemes, which had specified the amount, by weight, of domestic components that 
had to be used in South African automobiles, were abolished. Today, the industry is 
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quite large, accounting for over 5% of GDP.262 Exports have grown rapidly since 
1995, when import protection began to fall. Between 1997 and 2000, exports of ‘light 
automobiles’ (personal vehicles) rose from 10,000 to 58,000 annually.263 Most 
domestically produced vehicles are built by subsidiaries of multinationals; Nissan, 
BMW, Volkswagen, Daimler-Chrysler, and Toyota all operate in South Africa. The 
country is responsible for around 80% of Africa’s vehicle production, making it a 
formidable force in the international vehicle market.264 Nonetheless, South Africa 
remains a net importer of vehicles, something which the ANC hopes to correct in the 
future. 
 Other numbers tell a somewhat different story, however. While exports have 
grown, total production has fallen; between 1990 and 2000, annual production 
decreased from 335,000 to 277,000 units.265 This is not surprising, as the motor 
vehicle industry has been exposed more profoundly to international market pressure 
under the MIDP. Tariffs have fallen and other restrictions have been lifted across the 
complex industry regime.  
 More importantly for our purposes, industry employment has fallen 
significantly. The employment pinnacle was reached in 1988, at nearly 100,000 
workers. Between that point and 1995, it fell by almost 30%, while producers were 
exposed for the first time to worldwide competition. Employment rates were 
supposed to rise thereafter, as vehicle producers became leaner and took advantage of 
export subsidies. They have not. During the best times of the last 10 years, 
employment growth has been little better than flat.266  
 This mirrors worldwide industry trends, and has not come as a surprise to 
NUMSA and COSATU. Nonetheless, it has likely been aggravated by the ANC, 
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which has valued export growth in fully built vehicles over employment. The largest 
subsidies received by vehicle producers are Import-Export Complementation credits, 
with which firms offset the duties owed on imports of components or fully built 
vehicles by exporting the equivalent value. The government, however, has been 
gradually scaling back this incentive since the mid-1990’s. In 2003, the Productive 
Asset Allowance (PAA) began to replace the Import-Export Complementation credits 
as the primary export subsidy. The PAA currently grants import duty credits equal to 
20% of the value of ‘productive’ fixed investment made in a given year. This is a 
capital equipment subsidy. In the absence of an off-setting employment subsidy, it 
engenders bias toward the substitution of capital for labor. Given that South Africa 
imports most of the equipment used for vehicle production, this subsidy negatively 
affects employment rates, exacerbating the savage unemployment crisis. 
 According to the calculations of Frank Flatters, a professor at Queens College 
(Canada), the MIDP cost R11 billion ($1.05 billion) in 2002 (and subsidy rates have 
not changed dramatically since then), or R138,000 ($13,000) per worker. Given that 
some of these jobs would exist even in the absence of subsidies, the cost per marginal 
worker is much higher.267 In the same year, an IMF study estimated that a direct 
employment subsidy costing the government less than R650 million would create 
113,000 jobs, more than the total employment in the motor vehicle industry and 
enough to reduce unemployment by 5%.268 While the report suggested such a policy, 
it was evidently ignored; the ANC does not always march to the IFI tune.  
 The cost of the MIDP and the potential for pro-employment use of the 
resources dedicated to automotive industry subsidies demonstrate the intensity of the 
ANC’s commitment to the image of South African business. Countries as diverse as 
Malaysia, Brazil, and Australia have spent billions upon billions of dollars to 
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subsidize their motor vehicle sectors, in order that they might be players in an 
industry in which the rewards are often seen more in terms of national pride than of 
profit. So far, the only clear overall beneficiaries of the MIDP are the multinationals 
that gain from its incentive program.269 COSATU has called for an investigation into 
the MIDP’s effect upon employment before the government commits to new 
spending on ‘targeted’ industrial policies.270 It is certainly in labor’s interest to do so. 
But it may be too late. The increasingly assertive ANC elite has lined up behind 
industrial projects like the construction of the Coega port facility on the Eastern Cape, 
which thus far primarily serves the needs of a German submarine company, in an 
exceptionally capital-heavy sector. Dreams of (third-world) South Africa donning a 
first-world veneer have again taken precedence over the concerns of labor.   
 
 D. Unflagging Faith? 
 
 ANC support for costly industrial policy and labor law reform exemplify one 
of the recurring themes of this paper. What western policy makers deride as ‘picking 
winners’ may have aided some East Asian countries in their developmental rise in the 
late 20th century. While I cannot examine the merits of Asian industrial policy, East 
Asia can be usefully contrasted with South Africa. Japan, and later Korea and Taiwan 
pursued sectoral policies designed to help them ‘climb the product ladder’. 
Meanwhile, South Africa has attempted to make a Herculean leap to the top, skipping 
most of the rungs. The peculiar aspirations of a new South African elite partially 
explain this. 
 The ANC has attempted to spark growth through liberalization in many area, 
including those described in chapters 5-7. But with COSATU an ally and consistent 
vote delivery mechanism, Pretoria has treaded lightly on the union’s home turf: labor 
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legislation. With other options exhausted, the ANC may now see labor law as the last 
area through which to reroute the economy to the ‘right track’ through neoliberal 
reform.  
 Labor market reform may very well benefit the South African economy. That, 
however, will not be the ANC’s sole concern in its implementation. Precedent 
indicates that the ANC believes that it is making an investment in the future by 
bolstering the nation’s reputation abroad (and in its domestic business community). 
South Africans must hope that, this time, the world notices.  
 
























“Never in its wildest dreams did capital think that things would go so much in its 
favor in the new South Africa” 
 
- COSATU Secretary-General Zwelinzima Vavi speaking to the CEPPWAWU 




 At the moment of COSATU’s founding, Cyril Ramaphosa exclaimed that “a 
giant has risen.” Has that creature suffered an historical fall, or will labor again be 
ascendant in South Africa?  
 Emerging evidence points to the continuing marginalization of the union 
movement. The ANC has relented to labor pressure in few areas, and most future 
proposals appear aimed at temporarily and peripherally assuring labor of its relevance 
while disregarding it in core areas of policy. The ANC recently unveiled the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGI). Pretoria asserts that this document 
represents a fundamental reorientation of policy away from macro to micro and 
industry specific concerns, tacitly admitting that GEAR has channeled attention and 
resources to the former. 
 It is known that this program will frame the development of a fully-fledged 
sector-based industrial strategy. It identifies a number of sectors for targeted 
initiatives, focusing attention upon tourism and on attracting service jobs from the 
developed world. According to Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka, multinationals 
have outsourced thus far essentially none of their ‘back-office’ work to South 
Africa.271 She asserts, however, that the potential for riding the outsourcing wave is 
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great. She has appointed Minister of Trade and Industry Mandisi Mpahlwa and the 
chair of (the private) Standard Bank to lead a committee that will propose a set of 
incentives to multinationals and their contractors. ANC hopes now rest with a more 
interventionist approach, a symbiotic relationship between capital and government 
harnessed to spur growth and employment. 
 The government frames these policies as a fundamental break from the past. 
Indeed, they do substantively redefine the role of the government in the economy. 
More tellingly, they turn way from the more rigorously liberal approach of the past 
ten years. In recent decades, industrial policy has been anathema to the IFIs, who 
decry what they consider to be its pernicious consequences on efficiency, 
employment, and competition. And yet, the IFIs have not forcefully disapproved of 
industrial policy in South Africa as it exists, nor have they publicly signaled that an 
expansion would raise their ire. The ‘comprehensive’ analysis of the South African 
economy published by the IMF in January of 2006 dedicates precious little space to 
examination of industrial strategy. Pretoria appears to have been granted a carte 
blanche. 
 Do the new initiatives really constitute a new direction in policy? In a number 
of critical ways, they do. But in other respects they do not. Many of the past decade’s 
reforms have targeted investors, particularly foreign investors, with incentives and 
guarantees of stability. These began with the macro stabilization of the mid-1990’s 
and the opening of public assets to private interests, and now continue with a 
proposed program of sectoral development. It is clear that the ANC elite pursued 
orthodox policy for one or both of two reasons; to signal the attractiveness of South 
Africa to investors and/or to facilitate their own ascension into the rarified world of 
western elites.  
 Without knowing the private thoughts of South African leaders, it is 
impossible to untangle the two threads of this story. Their interplay is, by their very 
nature, complex, with each possibly reinforcing the other. Visibility of South African 
officials in international circles could contribute to the place afforded the country on 
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the agenda of multinationals and financiers. After all, observers of investment trends 
detect a great degree of faddishness in investment choices. The oddly pervasive idea 
that ‘you’re nobody if you’re not in China’ defines this sort of behavior. Even if 
investors do not act rationally (including by not acting upon the analysis of two 
institutions that they tend to respect, the World Bank and the IMF), might it not be 
rational for the ANC to play to their prejudices and broad stroke strategizing? 
Combining this with the fact that top ANC officials have the opportunity to ingratiate 
themselves with the west’s movers and shakers leaves Pretoria with a potent formula 
of incentives to embrace liberalism.   
 Effectively, the transition from macroeconomic adjustment to microeconomic 
management betrays that Pretoria’s goals, if not its techniques, have remained static. 
Demonstrating continuity with post-GEAR policy, current reforms principally target 
investors, and particularly foreigners. There has been minimal talk of a more inward-
looking approach to development. The government and the world continue to be 
perplexed by the low levels of FDI in South Africa (and even the low domestic 
investment rate). I cannot here determine the causes of this anemic interest, but a 
number of plausible options exist. South Africa is being ravaged by HIV/AIDS, and 
one might expect this to adversely affect both foreign perceptions and make domestic 
capital tepid. The explanatory power of these effects is disputed, however. A 2003 
University of Cape Town study of seven manufacturing firms in the Cape Flats area 
found that the firms incurred few extra costs due to HIV/AIDS, as their HIV positive 
workers tended to be unskilled and employed under temporary contracts.272 That is 
not to downplay the tragedy of HIV. However, there are other forces at work, which 
likely include: security concerns due to the high crime rate, dearth of skilled workers, 
local and provincial corruption, and, certainly, perception of high labor costs.   
 The reaction of investors to a renewed thrust in the direction of industrial 
policy cannot be determined. The only thing that is sure is that the aspiration of ANC 
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leaders to make South Africa a world-class export power has not waned, even in the 
face of numerous failures. The government has almost entirely freed capital from 
restriction since 1995, has curtailed budget deficits and forced the provinces to put 
their books in order, has privatized pieces of infrastructure and public enterprises, and 
has done these things with gusto. It has yet to pay off to the degree necessary if South 
Africans hope to escape crushing poverty and chronic underdevelopment through 
liberalization. 
 Labor’s discomfiting experience within the Tripartite Alliance proves that 
some combination of the forces of Pretoria’s interest in attracting investment and 
personal desire for recognition have been at work since liberation. Labor’s defense of 
its last prerogatives appears tenuous, and the rhetoric employed in the exposition of 
the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative presages serious labor market reform. 
Terms like ‘labor market inclusion’ are becoming ever more prominent in official 
discourse. COSATU is not oblivious to the fact that the ASGI makes to pull the rug 
out from under its feet. The new initiative indulges many of labor’s less prescriptive 
but still central demands, including those for closer demand management and greater 
support for labor-intensive industries. Yet COSATU still fears that the policies of the 
future “will fall far short despite [their] laudable aims.”273 Why? Unions worry firstly 
that liberal inertia will carry policy away from stated goals. And more importantly, 
the prospect of labor market reform remains on the table. Recently, the ANC 
proposed discontinuing the operation of labor courts parallel to the standard courts. 
This would be a devastating blow. 
 What is the future of South African labor in a world of increasing commercial 
and ideological globalization? The South African state retains a larger degree of 
sovereignty over its economic policy than its rhetoric would have us believe. The 
question is: will it exercise that sovereignty? Is talk of industrial policy the harbinger 
of winds of change? Or will South Africa continue to outsource major decisions to 
                                                 




Washington and to New York, to London and to Frankfurt, and to the most orthodox 
halls of western academia?   
 The current crop of ANC leaders, with Mbeki and Manuel as their vanguard, 
appear loath to assert that independence. The Tripartite Alliance has been shaken, 
time and again, by the ANC’s disregard for labor, and yet has survived. Even if it 
does not, there is little reason to believe that ANC will be challenged; the labor 
movement lacks the strength and the natural allies required to fundamentally realign 
the political landscape. Inequality in power has defined the alliance since liberation, 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. 
 But events may unfold in very different way. Pretoria looks abroad for 
approbation. Domestic forces, or turnover atop the ANC hierarchy (Zuma is still a 
wildcard) may shift its gaze inward. And even if they do not, the western consensus is 
not fixed and inexorable. That it must be qualified as western, and not universal, has 
great implications. If China makes to join the developed world, how will the elites 
and intellectuals of Europe and America reconcile their developmental philosophy to 
a country whose practices contradict many of its tenets? The Washington twins 
managed, for a long time, to downplay the role of state intervention in the 
development of Korea and Taiwan; would they be able to do the same in the case of 
the Middle Kingdom? There is a good bit of soul-searching going on today at the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Internal discord has reached a level unknown since the 
great liberal counter-revolution of the 1970’s and early 1980’s. Change in South 
Africa could be home grown or imported. 
 Relations among South Africa’s largest labor federation, its estranged partner 
in Pretoria, and the puissant Washington institutions speak to the confusion, struggle, 
and compromise that occur at the nexus of economic and power relations in the 
modern nation state. The case of South Africa aptly demonstrates the richness and 
complexity of these interactions. The nation must strive to throw off the weight of a 
unique and perverse history while awakening to the precariousness of life in the 
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international economy. For the sake of its long suffering citizens, one must hope that 
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